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ARTICLE
HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW OF WORK
Cass R. Sunstein*
INTRODUcrION

A. A Problem and a Proposal
N allocating rights in the workplace, the law has many options. It
might, for example, confer certain rights on employers, but allow
employees to purchase those rights (to, say, parental leave, health
insurance, or vacation time) through a voluntary trade. It might
make certain employers' rights nonwaivable; it might say, for example, that an employee, or a group of employees, cannot buy an
employer's right to donate money to political campaigns. It might
give employees certain waivable rights, saying, for example, that an
employee is presumed to have a right to at least four weeks of vacation each year, but that employers can buy that right through a
suitable deal. Or it might give employees rights that cannot be
waived, saying, for example, that no worker may be asked to trade

* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of

Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science. This Article is the
foundation for the McCorkle Lecture, delivered at the University of Virginia on
September 25, 2000. Because it is the foundation for a lecture, it avoids the usual

extensive footnoting; the reader is asked to make allowances for an Article originally
prepared for oral presentation. I am grateful to comments from many people,
including Alan Hyde, Russell Korobkin, David Laibson, Eric Posner, and Richard
Posner. Participants in the Summer Institute on Behavioral Economics, held in July

2000, provided valuable comments. Special thanks to Daniel Kahneman, for specific
and general help, and also to Richard Thaler for overall guidance on behavioral

economics. None of these people should be held responsible for errors here.
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the right to four weeks of vacation each year. There are many possible variations.
The basic purpose of this Article is to bring a better understanding of human behavior, with the assistance of cognitive psychology
and behavioral economics,1 to bear on the most basic questions in
employment law. 2 I offer two general claims. The first is that waivable workers' rights represent a promising approach for the future,
partly because waivable rights lack the rigidity of nonwaivable
ones, and partly because they ensure that employers will provide
key information to workers. The second claim is that traditional
understandings of employee behavior and employment law make
many blunders, because they are based on an inadequate sense of
workers' actual values and behavior. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom:
* Workers are especially averse to losses, and not as much concerned with obtaining gains;
" Workers often do not know about legal rules, including key
rules denying them rights;
* Workers may well suffer from excessive optimism;
" Workers care a great deal about being treated fairly, and are
willing to punish employers who have treated them unfairly,
even at the workers' own expense;3
" Workers often prefer increasing wage profiles;
" Many workers greatly discount the future, sometimes treating it as irrelevant; and

See Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Richard H.
Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics (1991); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998).
21 use this term to refer to both "labor law," traditionally taken to refer to the law
relating to unions and unionization, and "employment law," traditionally taken to
refer
to the law relating to statutory protections of workers.
3
This is the basic theme of Truman F. Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall During A
Recession (1999). Id. at 173-80 (discussing this point in particular). In a series of
important papers, Ernst Fehr and his colleagues have explored this point in many
settings. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocal Fairness and Non-Compensating
Wage Differentials, 152 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 608 (1996); Ernst
Kirchler et al., Social exchange in the labor market: Reciprocity and trust versus
egoistic maximization, 17 J. Econ. Psych. 313 (1996).
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* Workers often care more about their relative economic position, or how their income compares with others, than about
their absolute economic position, or how many dollars they
are making in the abstract.
In short, workers are like most people. They behave like homo
sapiens, not like homo economicus' Hence one of my principal
purposes here is to bring an understanding of behavioral economics to bear on some of the central issues in the law of work-and to
show how such an understanding helps correct the prevailing wisdom insofar as it is grounded in neoclassical economics We shall
also find, in incipient form, what might be called the implicit behavioral rationality of certain aspects of contemporary law, as
courts and legislatures show an understanding of the points listed
above.
More specifically, I will attempt to show how a more realistic
understanding of workers' thoughts and actions helps sort out the
relevant inquiries in the choice among the four principal approaches to the law of labor-management relations: (1) waivable
employers' rights, (2) waivable workers' rights, (3) nonwaivable
workers' rights, and (4) waivable workers' rights with constraints
on permissible waiver. I suggest that in many situations, the law
should confer certain entitlements on employees rather than employers, but allow those entitlements to be waived, either at a
market price (an "unconstrained waiver") or subject to governmentally determined floors, whether procedural or substantive (a
"constrained waiver"). The principal purpose of this approach is to
ensure that employers fully disclose contractual terms to employees and allow employees to waive only when waiver is thought to
be worthwhile, without producing the rigidity, inefficiency, and potential harm to workers and consumers alike that are created by
systems of nonwaivable, "one-size-fits-all" terms.6

4 See Richard H. Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J. Econ.
Persp. 133 (2000).
5See infra pp. 165-68 for an overview.
6A

system of nonwaivable terms is urged in Charles Fried, Individual and

Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law
and Its Prospects, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1012 (1984); my criticisms of the more ad hoc
system of modem statutory law apply to Fried's general proposal as well.
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This basic idea could be applied to both unionized and nonunionized workplaces. It could even be applied to the question of
whether workers are collectively organized at all: A default rule
might specify collective organization and allow workers to opt out
rather than specifying the opposite and allowing them to opt in.' It
is especially important to see that the default rule matters. What I
will ultimately suggest is a two-tiered system of employment law,
involving (a) nonwaivable statutory minima, below which no
workplace may go, and (b) waivable workers' rights, involving an
ample set of safeguards that employers may buy for a fee agreed
upon by both workers and employers.8 The real questions should
involve the content of the two categories.
B. An Unduly Limited Debate
In the workplace, as elsewhere, the law cannot "do nothing."9
For even the most enthusiastic believers in private property and
freedom of contract, it is necessary to start somewhere-not with
nature or voluntary arrangements but with an initial allocation of
legal rights.
Most debates in American employment law have been framed
narrowly and in terms of three alternatives: waivable employers'
rights, collective bargaining, and nonwaivable workers' rights. Under a system of waivable employers' rights, the law confers an
initial entitlement on employers but allows employees to buy the
relevant right if they have both the desire and the leverage to do
so. It is important to emphasize that the employer has these rights
not by nature, and not as a result of anything consensual, but because of a distinctly legal decision to confer the relevant rights on
the employer rather than the employee. The rights at issue often
involve the most fundamental questions for workers: job security;
workplace safety; pensions; health insurance; leave policy; vacation
time; freedom from race, sex, and age discrimination; and so forth.

7See

8

Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace 228-30 (1990).

For a brief suggestion along the same lines for worker safety, see Susan Rose-

Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98
Yale L.J. 341,358-60 (1988).
9See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and

Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1090 (1972).
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This simple idea-of waivable employers' fights-captures much
of the common law of labor relations." The common law confers a
wide range of entitlements on employers, subject to individual bargaining. The single exception is the labor power of the employee."
Of course, the law grants employees, not employers, the right to
the employee's time and labor. 12 This is a fight that employees can
and do trade for money and other benefits of employment.
The flexibility of the common law approach is its great advantage. Such flexibility in one sense promotes liberty, because it
allows diverse employers and employees to select the approach
that fits them best, and also efficiency, because it promises to protect mutually satisfactory deals. But it is not clear that most
workers have the information that would equip them to engage in
appropriate bargaining, and it is possible to think that many individual employees, bargaining with employers, will lack the
knowledge or the power to produce efficient or fair deals without
some form of collective organization. In any case, the initial allocation of rights to employers remains to be defended.
In the 1930s, the United States ventured a second approach to
labor-management relations. This approach, embodied in the National Labor Relations Act 3 ("NLRA"), was a dramatic, even
revolutionary step: a mechanism for solution of disagreements via
collective bargaining. On this view, entitlements are generally
given to employers, as with the common law, but workers are allowed or encouraged to organize as a group. Workplace
0This is described and defended in Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor
Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357 (1983).

What Epstein does not sufficiently acknowledge is the extent to which a number of
rights are conferred on the employer by the common law; any suggestion that the
common law reflects "laissez-faire," or promotes "voluntary interactions," should be

prefaced with this point. In this vein, see Fried, supra note 6, at 1016: "Only by
assuming that the preexisting common law system of property rights had some
natural, preconventional status can the expropriationary thrust of the Wagner Act (to
the extent that there is one) be criticized." A better way to put it would be to suggest

that the very claim that there is an expropriationary thrust in the Wagner Act
depends on the (implausible) claim that the common law system of property rights
has some natural, preconventional status.
" Note the contrast with a system of slavery, in which the law confers on employers
a right to the employee's labor. The employers' right is waivable in the sense that the
employer can pay the slave a salary or even grant the slave freedom.
Slavery is an obvious exception.
"29

U.S.C.

§§ 151-169 (1994).
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management is decided via a process of employer-employee bargaining, thus organized. In some ways, the NLRA's arrangement is
more complicated and more interesting than this account suggests.
With respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining-wages, hours,
and working conditions-the NLRA removes common law rights
from employers and creates bargaining entitlements, that is, entitlements that are not owned by anyone in particular but that will
be a product of bargaining, having been deliberately placed, as an
initial step, in the hands of neither side. 4
This system of worker organization and collective rather than
individual bargaining has been justified on many diverse grounds. 5
Most obviously, collective bargaining allows information to be
shared and pooled among workers, and hence it should permit
them to overcome the many evident barriers to informed bargaining (an issue to which I will return). A point especially congenial to
the perspective here is that union representation might also respond to short-sightedness, or bounded rationality, on the part of
individual workers, producing outcomes that would best serve their
long-term interests. Perhaps collective organization is simply necessary to produce industrial peace. At the same time, union
representation resolves a collective action problem faced by individual workers who would compete, perhaps to their collective
detriment, in the process of seeking employment. 7 Selforganization could create a kind of workers' cartel, justified on the
ground that the result would be to extract better deals from em-

14See
Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of
Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of
Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349, 1371-74

(1988).
,-,The literature is immense. For summaries, see Richard B. Freeman & James L.
Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 3-25 (1984); Michael C. Harper & Samuel Estreicher,
Labor Law 2-4 (4th ed. 1996).
0 For relevant evidence, see Freeman & Medoff, supra note 15, at 20 (emphasizing
distinct features of compensation packages favored by unions, including an emphasis
on long-term problems).
17For an early statement, see John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, in
Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism 1, 349-51 (Jonathan Riley
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1848). For more contemporary statements, see
Freeman & Medoff, supra note 15, at 7-11; Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of
Labor Law, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 988 (1984).
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ployers (possibly at the expense of nonunionized workers)." In any
case, many of the goods provided by employers-safety, decent
lighting, heat, pension benefits, formal procedures in the event of
arbitrary discharge-are "local public goods" in the sense that they
cannot be provided to one without being simultaneously provided
to all or most. In these circumstances a collective voice might ensure against the underproduction of such goods.19 Whatever its
goals, the collective bargaining approach has fallen on hard times
with the decline of union representation since the 1950s, a decline
related to workers' uncertainty about whether unionization would
help or hurt them.'
The third approach involves nonwaivable employees' rights.
Under this system, the law confers the relevant right on employees,
and employers and employees are forbidden from contracting
around the legal guaranty. The relevant right might be a right to
protection from occupational risks; it might be a right to be free
from discharge on grounds of race, sex, or age; it might be a right
not to be discharged for engaging in collective bargaining or for refusing to violate the law on the employers' behalf. As a matter of
history, the third approach seems largely a reaction to the first, fueled by complaints about employers' bargaining power and about
the perceived injustice of the common law approach.2' This approach dominates the current system of statutory protections for
workers in America ' it also dominates the more aggressively

18The "union wage premium" is generally estimated at 10% to 30%. See Freeman
& Medoff, supra note 15, at 43-60; Harper & Estreicher, supra note 15, at 14. Unions
also produce a mix in the compensation package, with particularly favorable effects
on fringe benefits. See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 15, at 61-77. Thus unionized

"establishments are especially likely to allot funds to deferred forms of compensation

favoring senior workers, such as pensions, insurance, and vacation pay, and to have a
large impact on smaller establishments." Id. at 77.

19See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 15, at 8-9.
20See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product

Markets, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3, 4-20 (1993).

11See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On

Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404 (1967).

"See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994) (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, with
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions); id. §§ 651-678 (1994) (Occupational
Safety and Health Act); id. §§ 2601-2654 (1994) (Family and Medical Leave Act); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994) (Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII).
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worker-protective systems of employment and labor law in
Europe.
The rise of nonwaivable employees' rights can be seen as a surrogate for a more robust system of collective bargaining.' But at
the same time, it can be seen as a way of relieving any pressure to
create that very system. If statutory protections are in place, a union might seem quite unnecessary, as the law is already giving
employees what the union might have provided. A robust system
of statutory guarantees would make union representation far less
desirable. At the same time, an approach based on nonwaivable
workers' rights might be criticized on grounds of its rigidity. Perhaps many workers would be better off with the flexibility to trade
some goods for others, and perhaps consumers would benefit as
well.24
C. Workers' Rights, With Bargaining
This, then, is a basic picture of contemporary issues and debates
in employment law. But several things are missing from the picture. Most important: What if the law allocates the relevant
entitlement to employees, but also makes the right waivable, in the
sense that the employer could buy it, and the employee could sell
it, for a fee? In principle, there is nothing at all strange about this
idea. With respect to the employee's time, for example, the common law allocates rights in exactly this fashion; before
employment, the individual has a property right over the course of
his day that the employer can purchase for whatever amount the
employee is willing to accept.' We could easily imagine a system in
which rights of this sort were a far larger part of the picture than
they currently are. For example, employees might have and be
permitted to waive rights not to be discharged without good cause;

3Cf. Fried, supra note 6, at 1020-37 (arguing for a statement of nonwaivable
entitlements as a replacement for collective bargaining). Fried's argument is criticized
in Cass R. Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. Chi.

L. Rev. 1041 (1984).
2This
is a generalization of the argument in Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden
Grounds (1995).
2This is meant not in the sense that workers can "sell themselves into slavery," but

in the sense that workers can make binding contracts to do certain things, on pain of

sanctions.
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rights not to be fired on grounds of race, sex, religion, or age; rights
to health insurance or occupational safety; rights to parental leave;
or rights to vacation time. All of these rights would operate as default rules for employers to purchase if a mutually agreeable deal
could be arranged. Waiver might operate individually or collectively; the law might or might not impose constraints on waivers.
What is absent from the traditional account is not only a full
sense of the legal possibilities, but also an adequate picture of
workers' judgments and motivations. To the extent that analysis of
labor law has worked from any such picture, it is the one found in
traditional economics.f But we know enough to know that this picture is inaccurate. Indeed, we know a great deal about how it is
inaccurate, and about what must be done to make it more nearly
correct.27 I attempt here to bring a better understanding of human
behavior to bear on the various alternatives.
This Article comes in six parts. Part I will discuss the debate over
at-will employment, with reference to emerging developments that
suggest a possible waivable right to be discharged for cause. The
at-will debate is well-trodden ground, but a behavioral approach
offers some new perspectives, and in many ways the particular issue is representative of many other problems in employment law.
Part II will discuss some arguments for a nonwaivable background
rule, the standard approach in modern statutory law. Part III will
generalize the idea of waivable workers' rights by briefly exploring
a number of contemporary questions in employment law. Part IV
will discuss problems with allowing waiver, with particular reference to third-party effects, information-processing, and collective
efforts to change norms and values. My goal will be to provide a refined sense of when and why waiver might be disallowed, in a way
that goes beyond the conventional search for externalities. Part V
will discuss the difference between individual waivers and union
waivers. Part VI will address workers' concern with relative economic position, not just absolute economic position-a fact that
supports the idea of nonwaivable terms by suggesting that such
terms can maintain workers' relative position while giving them a
26See,

e.g., Epstein, supra note 10, at 1358 (using the traditional economic mold).
For an overview, see Thaler, supra note 1; see also Jolls et al, supra note 1, at 1358 (providing a theory of economic analysis "that reflects a better understanding of
human behavior and its wellsprings").
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benefit such as more leisure time, better health, or more time with
their families.
II. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE AT-WILL DEBATE

The debate over the contract at will has recently become one of
the liveliest in all of private lawl This debate is in some ways
unique, for reasons that I will discuss in some detail, but it also has
features in common with related debates involving, for example,
parental leave, vacation time, health care, and age discrimination.
With the decline in private-sector unions, 29 the common law is now
a principal arena for new contests about the nature of management-labor relations; the permissible grounds for discharge under
the evolving common law have thus received a great deal of judicial as well as academic attentionf My particular goal is to show
how a better understanding of human behavior casts new light on
the issue,31 in a way that unequivocally suggests the hazards of relying on a system of waivable employers' rights, and that also
suggests, though more equivocally, the value of creating waivable
employees' rights instead.
A. Background and Movement
In America, the general rule is that employment is at will: An
employer can fire an employee for any reason or for no reason at
28See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 7, at 48-104 (challenging the at-will rule); Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984) (arguing for
the at-will rule); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of
Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 105
(1997) [hereinafter Kim, Bargaining] (finding that workers lack information about the
rule); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on
Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 447 [hereinafter Kim, Norms]
(reporting that workers view their legal rights in the context of at-will employment
contracts); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 8 (1993) (discussing risk of opportunistic
behavior).
2 See Estreicher, supra note 20, at 4-20. The percentage of the private
nonagricultural workforce belonging to unions fell from about 35.7% in 1953 to about
11.5% in 1992. Id. at 3 & n.1.
30See sources cited supra note 28; Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment:
The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1783, 1783-86 (1996).
31As far as I am aware, the only existing discussion of the contract at will, from this
point of view, can be found in the illuminating discussion in Issacharoff, supra note 30.
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all. In recent decades, however, courts have made three inroads on
this rule, involving third-party effects, opportunistic behavior, and
promises inferred from ambiguous statements.
1. Third-PartyEffects
There is now a set of public policy exceptions to the at-will rule 2
For example, an employer may not discharge an employee for refusing to commit a crime on his behalf. The key organizing idea
behind the public policy exceptions is that when a third-party interest is at stake, the at-will principle does not apply.3 Insofar as
such interests are at stake, the decisions make a great deal of sense.
The analysis is straightforward, and the decisions do not present
difficult issues about workers and their motivations.
2. OpportunisticDischargesand the Implicit BehavioralRationality
of the Modern Common Law
In a separate and more complex line of cases, courts have found
an implied "covenant of good faith and fair dealing."' This idea
seems to forbid "opportunistic discharges"-as, for example, when
an employer discharges an employee immediately before the employee is to receive a commission, a pension, or some other benefit
that he seems to have earned. 5 The best rationale for these decisions is that they violate implicit contractual understandings. 6 To
understand this point, some brief background is in order, for this is
the first place where we shall see how a behavioral understanding
unsettles the conventional view and better explains both the data
and the case law.

n See, e.g., Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1991); Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); Remington Freight Lines v. Larkey, 644 N.E.2d 931, 940 (Ind.Ct. App.
1994); Brigham v. Dillon Cos., 935 P.2d 1054,1059 (Kan. 1997).
See Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party
Effects, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1943 (1996).
3 Mark A. Rothstein et al., Employment Law 690-94 (2d ed. 1999).
3- See Hoffman-La Roche v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725,738-39 (Ala. 1987); Merrill v.
Crothall-American 606 A.2d 96, 101 (Del. 1992); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co.,
364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977); K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370
(Nev. 1987); Rothstein et al., supra note 34, at 690-94.
36 See Schwab, supra note 28, at 33.
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In the conventional view,' the interests of workers and employers ensure against opportunistic discharges, understood as
discharges in violation of the parties' implicit agreements. As the
standard account of life-cycle justice goes, employers subsidize
workers during an initial training period in which wages exceed
productivity. Here the employer is making an investment in workers, hoping to recoup that investment after the training period is
finished, as workers build up firm-specific human capital. After
training, the worker's productivity inside the firm increases over
time, as do workers' wages. But wages increase less rapidly than
does productivity for the remainder of the worker's career. In effect, the worker was subsidized in the training period; after that
time, he subsidizes the employer, because productivity is higher
than wages even though both continue to increase.
For purposes of law, the distinctive feature of this account is that
the law need not intervene to bind the employer to the employee,
or the reverse. The worker wants to stay, because his inside wage is
higher than his wage in other workplaces where he lacks firmspecific human capital. At the same time, the employer wants the
worker to stay, because the worker's wage continues to be lower
than his productivity inside the firm. The elegance of the account
lies in its purported demonstration that the self-interest of both
parties will prevent behavior that might be opportunistic, inefficient, or unfair.
As Stewart Schwab has shown in an important essay, there are
serious problems with this conventional account.' An obvious difficulty is posed by the widespread existence of mandatory
retirement rules, now unlawful under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act39 ("ADEA"). If productivity continues to be
higher than wages, why on earth would employers seek to get rid of
older workers? The question suggests that productivity will not, at
a certain stage, be higher than wages after all-or at least that an
employer can do better with replacements. A further problem
stems from evidence that workers' wages are, toward the end of ca31This account is outlined in detail in Schwab, supra note 28, at 13-15. I draw on
Schwab's superb account throughout this discussion, adding only a fuller sense of the
behavioral foundations of the view he defends.

See id. at 15-19.
3129 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
33
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reers, higher than productivity, so that late-career workers are, in
effect, being subsidized by employers, in a way that apparently
provides compensation for workers' subsidy of employers in midcareer." An additional problem-or perhaps it is an explanation of
the problem just noted-comes from detailed evidence of the "efficiency wage," by which employers pay employees a bit more than
they must, in order to prevent shirking.' An examination of the relationship between productivity and wages suggests that promises
of payment in late career, including pensions and wages above
productivity, are part of a bargain by which employers induced
good work from people who might otherwise choose merely adequate work.
On this account of the situation, the deal between employers and
employees is not self-enforcing.42 Employers have an incentive to
behave opportunistically, by discharging late-career employees, in
violation of the implicit deal. There is a potential role for law to
prevent this opportunistic behavior, thus promoting efficiency and
fairness alike. More specifically, law might forbid discharges in violation of the bargain revealed by an understanding of the life-cycle
model of employment. In fact, a number of cases involving violations of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing seem to
reflect a judgment of exactly this sort. 3 Thus it is possible to see, in
the modern developments, an implicit behavioral foundation to the
innovation away from the simplest form of the contract at will.'
I have yet to provide an understanding of why the relationship
between productivity and wages takes the form that it does. Here
behavioral economics provides some clues. The first point has to
do with fairness and its relationship to morale. Behavioral econo4 See James L. Medoff & Katherine G. Abraham, Are Those Paid More Really
More Productive? The Case of Experience, 16 J. Hum. Resources 186 (1981); James
L. Medoff & Katherine G. Abraham, Experience, Performance, and Earnings, 95 Q.J.
Econ. 703 (1980); Schwab, supra note 28, at 16.
41See Schwab, supra note 28, at 16; see also George A. Akerlof, An Economic
Theorist's Book of Tales 151-54 (1984) (describing the phenomenon as a partial gift).
42See

Schwab, supra note 28, at 19.

43See

sources cited supra note 35; see also Schwab, supra note 28, at 38-51
(describing cases best explained by the life-cycle model).
See Schwab, supra note 28, at 19-28; see also Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1813 (1996) [hereinafter
Jolls, Hands-Tying] (supporting the ADEA as a potentially efficient response to the
life-cycle model).
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mists emphasize that people care about fairness-about being fair
and perhaps even more about being treated fairly.45 Hence they are
likely to sacrifice economic self-interest, especially to punish those
who have been unfair to them.46 Evidence shows that workers care
a great deal about being treated fairly, that judgments about fairness do not depend only on the absolute level of wages, and that
employees are entirely willing to punish employers who violate
employees' perception of fairness.47 Employers are aware of this
fact and behave accordingly, so as to maintain morale and thus
prevent shirking or worse. 8 The existence of the efficiency wage is
best explained in these terms. Employers give employees somewhat more than they need to give; in return, employees do the
same for employers. At the same time, the promise of benefits
down the line-pensions, increasing wages-encourages the employee to bind himself to the employer, both by staying there and
by doing good work.
The second explanation for the revised understanding of the relationship between productivity and wages is that, like everyone
else, employees are loss averse, in the sense that they do not like
losses from the status quo. This preference imposes severe pressures on employers' ability to set wage structures.49 Employees
would predictably rebel against an employer's decision to set wages
below productivity if the consequence was that late-career employees would find their wages gradually shrinking. Employers' failure
to reduce the wages of older workers fits with the understanding
that any reduction in wages would cause severe morale problemsa point that helps explain employers' general reluctance to reduce
wages, even in recessions.'0
A third and closely-related point is that employees appear to
prefer rising wage profiles." Many people would rather see wages
See Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1489-96.
See id.; Bewley, supra note 3, at 175-76; Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Social
Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model 1 (Jan. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
41 See Bewley, supra note 3, at 175-76.
46

43 See

id.

41See id.

-See id.
- See George Loewenstein & Nachum Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer Increasing
Wage Profiles?, 9 J. Lab. Econ. 67 (1991).
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for the next four years take the form $50,000, $55,000, $60,000,
$70,000, rather than $70,000, $60,000, $55,000, $50,000-even
though the latter is worth more. The observed steady increase in
wages, even in the face of not-increasing or even decreasing productivity, undoubtedly has something to do with this motivation.
3. Inferences FromAmbiguous Statements
Equally important for current purposes, courts have made some
movement toward inferring a contractual term of job security. The
inferences have been drawn on the basis of highly ambiguous
commitments from employers, such as a vague promise (referring
to permanent employment) and employee manuals (even those
that contain express disclaimers).' Here, too, we can find an implicit behavioral rationality in the law, rooted in an understanding
of what workers actually think.
As a consequence of these changes, the law is in flux in many
states. For example, Montana has enacted a statutory program designed to replace the at-will rule with a nonwaivable for-cause
regime, 3 and in 1991 the National Conference of Commissions on
State Laws adopted a similar rule as the Uniform Employment
Termination Act.'
B. Of Waiver and Default Rules: Does It Matter Who
Has the Entitlement?
Under the at-will rule, the common law confers the relevant entitlement on the employer. But entirely within a system of freedom
of contract, it would be equally possible to confer the entitlement
on workers, protecting them against discharge without cause, but
allowing them to waive that protection for an agreed-upon price.
The initial question is whether, in a regime of freedom of contract,
the default rule matters at all.
Under the conventional view, the default rule does not matter.
Here is a second place where, as we shall see, the conventional
view is wrong, and a behavioral approach does much better. The
See infra Section II.E.
See Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-901 et. seq. (1999).
See Model Employment Termination Act, reprinted in Mark A. Rothstein &
Lance Liebman, Employment Law 208-19 (3d ed. Statutory Supp. 1997).
5

53
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issue is complex, and lest the forest be lost for the trees, here is the
simple conclusion: The default rule may well matter a great deal,
because the party who is allocated the initial entitlement, in employment law or elsewhere, is likely to value it far more than he
would if the initial entitlement were given to the other side. In
other words, the default rule is highly likely to affect valuations, including workers' valuations.
1. The Endowment Effect and "Sticky" Default Rules
The Coase theorem states that if transaction costs are zero, the
initial allocation of the entitlement does not matter.5 5 The Coase
theorem actually suggests two different points. First, whatever the
content of the legal rule, the parties will bargain their way to the
efficient solution. Second, whatever the content of the legal rule,
the parties will bargain their way to the same solution. If these
points are right, it does not matter, assuming no transaction costs,
whether an employer or an employee is given the relevant entitlement. The question is how the Coase theorem bears on the
selection of default rules in the context of employment law.
Let us begin by supposing that with respect to contracting
around the job security term, transaction costs are zero. Is the
Coase theorem correct? It is clear that the theorem is on firm
ground insofar as it suggests that the parties will bargain their way
to an efficient result, whatever, the content of the legal rule. This is
very close to a definition of efficiency. If the employer very much
wants an at-will rule, and if the employee does not care much
about job security, the contract will provide for at-will employment, regardless of the content of the legal rule. If the background
rule is at will, there will be no contractual shift; if the background
rule is for-cause, the parties will bargain their way to an at-will
situation. Efficiency will follow no matter what the legal rule is. 6

5 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 8 (1960).

Of course the legal rule may have distributional consequences. If the
employment right at issue is a large part of the wealth of either side, its allocation

to one or another side will contribute to relative wealth. But in this context, it is
difficult to see how the choice of one or another waivable rule will have significant
distributive effects. So long as the parties can bargain, workers are not going to be
significantly poorer or richer if the default rule is one way rather than the other.
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Will the legal rule be not merely efficient but also the same?
Notwithstanding the Coase theorem, there is good reason to think
that it will not be.' The principal reason is the endowment effect, a
central behavioral finding in accordance with which people tend to
place a far higher value on an object if it is initially allocated to
them than if it is initially allocated to someone else.' Default rules
have a tendency to stick, in labor contracts as elsewhere. If people
are initially given a right to a certain good, they are likely to ask
more to give it up than they would be willing to pay for it in the
first instance.'9 We do not have direct evidence for the particular
case of job security, but if for-cause protection is initially given to
the employee, it is reasonable to predict that the employee will
demand more to relinquish job security than he would be willing to
pay to obtain the right in the first instance. It is less clear that the
endowment effect holds for large commercial actors. But if a right
to discharge at will is given to employers, it follows that some or
many employers will demand more to give it up than they would
pay to purchase it in the first instance. Thus the allocation of the
legal entitlement, to workers or to employers, will likely matter in
the sense that the ultimate outcome will be affected by the increased value placed upon the right simply by virtue of the initial
allocation.'
So long as the right is initially allocated to one or another side,
an endowment effect cannot be avoided. The only way to avoid
such an effect would be for the law to refuse to allocate any initial
right at all. At first glance this seems to be an incoherent and impossible idea: Any system, to get off the ground, requires an initial
allocation of rights, from which bargaining will take place. But the
idea is not as impossible as it seems.6' The law might say, for example, that a contract cannot be enforced unless express provision has
See Thaler, supra note 1, at 7-10.
m For evidence of the endowment effect in the area of default rules, see Russell
Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in
5

Behavioral Law and Economics, supra note 1, at 116.
-9See id.

Compare the suggestion in Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 359
(5th ed. 1998): "If the requirement were optimal it would be negotiated voluntarily."
The suggestion is not wrong, but it neglects the possibility that the initial allocation of
the right will determine what it is optimal.
611 am grateful to David Laibson for this suggestion.
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been made for or against job security; without such a provision, the
contract is void. Sometimes contract law does take this approach,
by refusing to specify terms for the parties. To get a bit ahead of
the story, this approach is a draconian form of information-forcing:
It requires the parties to be clear, and refuses to create terms for
them, even default terms.
But no one is now urging that the law should refuse to enforce
contracts lacking an express term for job security. The real question, here and elsewhere, is how'to select a default rule in the
presence of endowment effects. This remains a largely unexplored
question. 2 What I am emphasizing here is that the endowment effect confounds ordinary understandings of the problem, and I do
not intend to solve the large question of how to choose a default
rule when an endowment effect is inevitable. But the following
considerations are relevant to understanding the problem.
* Whether one or another endowment effect is to be
preferred cannot easily be decided on standard efficiency
grounds. So long as transaction costs are zero, either
allocation would produce efficiency. But a less standard
analysis, also aimed at efficiency, might point in fruitful
directions. It would ask whose welfare would increase most
by virtue of having the initial allocation. Suppose, for
example, that workers, if they were initially allocated forcause protection, would generally demand a great deal to
give it up (say, $1000); suppose too that employers, if they
were not initially given at-will protection, would be willing
to buy it only for a small price (say, $100). Suppose at the
same time that if employers were given the initial right, they
would not value it highly (and would sell it for, say, $110),
and also that if employees were not given the initial right,
they would not value it highly either (and would buy it only
for, say, $120). If this is so, we would have reason to believe
that efficiency favors a for-cause default rule because
welfare would be higher given that rule. One problem with
2A helpful

discussion is Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the

Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46
Stan. L. Rev. 663 (1994). I explore the issue in more detail in Cass R. Sunstein,
Switching the Default Rule (Jan. 9, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the

Virginia Law Review Association).
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this analysis is that it must usually be conducted in the
absence of data and therefore involves some speculation
about what people would do or prefer.
* The easiest cases for choosing one or another default rule
involve third-party effects. Indeed, if there are significant
third-party effects, a nonwaivable rule would probably be
best. With job security, however, no such third-party effects
are obvious. Compare this with the question of how to
handle rights to parental leave. Suppose that children
benefit from parental leave requirements (a proposition
that is not obviously true; if such requirements reduce
wages and employment, children might be hurt as well). If
so, the best approach is probably to create a nonwaivable
right to parental leave.
" It is important to ask whether there is a distributional
reason to favor one or another rule. If the allocation of the
initial entitlement to workers would have good
distributional consequences, there is reason to favor that
allocation. I will take up this issue in more detail below, but
for the moment note that significant distributive effects
should not be expected in this context, because the resource
gain from the initial allocation is not a large part of
workers' wealth. In any case the market is likely to adjust to
any switch, by, for example, producing a reduction in
workers' salaries, thus negating any distributive change.
* If we know why the endowment effect exists, we might be
able to make some progress in deciding on the default rule.
In asking about whether to use "willingness to pay" instead
of "willingness to accept," some progress has been made on
this question.' If the endowment effect stems from
confusion, or from bargaining behavior, it would seem to
make little sense to shift the entitlement.' Perhaps people,
and workers in particular, believe that the initial allocation
of the entitlement carries a certain moral weight, or
presumptive validity, so much so as to drive a wedge

suggested in Korobkin, supra note 62.
"See id. at 689-97. See also Sunstein, supra note 62, for more detailed discussion of

6As

this point.
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between willingness to pay and willingness to accept. In
some circumstances, selling a good might appear to be
illegitimate, an insult to dignity. Or perhaps some people
simply ignore, much of the time, the existence of
opportunity costs. For goods that are not simply money
tokens, people appear to think that continued ownership is
costless, or that the cost of not selling is far less than it is in
actuality. This might well be simple confusion. If that is the
source of the endowment effect, we should not use
"willingness to accept,"and there is no good reason to
switch the default rule.
A final question is whether, aside from efficiency and
distribution, desirable social effects would follow from
creating a "sticky" default rule of a certain kind. An
endowment effect of one or another sort might be
supported if it could be shown to have valuable effects on
social attitudes and norms. If, for example, it were thought
important to inculcate an attitude, on the part of workers,
of support for the right of job security, the case for a
waivable workers' right would be strengthened. The point is
perhaps easiest to see in the context of sexual harassment. If
employers have a right to harass employees sexually, but
employees can buy that entitlement through contractual
protection, we might think that the situation would have
harmful effects on norms and desires-and that a situation
in which employees have the right, waivable or not, would
be much better. As the example suggests, the line between a
very sticky default rule and a nonwaivable right might be
one of degree rather than one of kind; I take up this point
below.
2. Nonzero Transaction Costs: Paper,Information, Signaling
Thus far we have been exploring the effect of the initial endowment on ultimate outcomes, assuming transaction costs are zero,
and hence that workers and employers can costlessly contract
around the default rule. Of course, transaction costs are not zero in
the context of employment contracts. Some costs are present
merely by virtue of the need to generate paper to contract around
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an undesired background rule. Some costs come from the phenomenon of signaling.'
a. Paperand Information
If courts select a rule that most parties dislike, the paper costs,
while unlikely to be huge, may not be trivial. It would be necessary
to produce formal documents where silence would otherwise be
sufficient. Probably more important are information costs. Employers are repeat players, and many of them have sufficient
information to know what they are doing when they ask for or sign
a waiver. But employees are frequently imperfectly informed.' If
the legal right is allocated to employers, employees may not ask for
job security because they mistakenly believe that they have it, or
because they are unable to think properly about the subject. The
existence of information costs means that the initial allocation of
the legal right might turn out to matter a great deal, both to efficiency and to the ultimate outcome. As stated, this point depends
on no controversial claims from behavioral economics; I return to
it shortly.
b. Signaling
Signaling creates special problems in the area of job security. An
employer who is willing to offer job security might find that it is attracting marginal workers. At the same time, an employee who
presses hard for job security might be signaling that he will deserve
to be discharged. Even if employers and employees would generally be better off with a system of job security, many individual
employers and individual employees will rationally refuse to negotiate for it. Note that these points apply to many other contractual
rights for which employees might bargain. An employee might fail
to seek a right to parental leave, perhaps in the belief that such a
right already exists, or, more likely, because he believes that the
For a general discussion, see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000); in the

context of employment law, see the discussion of severance pay in Bewley, supra note
3, at 270.
6 See Kim, Bargaining, supra note 28, at 105-06.
67See Issacharoff, supra note 30, at 1794-1800; David I. Levine, Just-Cause
Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection, 9 J. Lab. Econ.

294 (1991).
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very request would signal a lack of commitment to work. In these
circumstances, a waivable employers' right is likely to stick even if
it is undesirable. There is evidence that this happens with respect
to severance pay; employees do not seek severance pay because
doing so sends a bad signal.'
These points do not demonstrate that one waivable rule is better
than another. But they are sufficient to show that the choice of the
default rule is likely to matter a great deal-both to efficiency and
to ultimate outcomes.
C. What Mimics the Market?
Suppose, then, that the legal rule will indeed matter. Under the
conventional approach, one with obvious implications for labormanagement relations in general, courts should seek the default
rule that best "mimics the market," in the sense that it is the rule
that employers and employees, armed with adequate information,
would generally seek.' In the context of labor law, it is not clear
that the legal system should choose the approach that would mimic
the market, even if it can identify that approach. Perhaps a different approach will redistribute resources in a desired direction," or
will have a salutary effect on the formation of preferences. But let
us begin by approaching the choice of the waivable term in the
conventional terms.
1. The Simple Case for At-Will Employment
Those who argue for a waivable employers' right claim that this
is what employees and employers would generally seek, and thus
that the existing background rule mimics the market.7 ' On this
view, employers have a strong reason to resist a for-cause regime,
to immunize themselves from illegitimate and even frivolous suits
and to ensure against shirking. Certainly employment at will seems
to be the general rule.' With an at-will rule, employers can prevent
IsSee Bewley, supra note 3,

at 270.
0 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 28.
70See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223 (2001)
[hereinafter Jolls, Accommodation Mandates].
71This is

the basic argument in Epstein, supra note 28.

" See J. Hoult Verkerke,

An

Empirical Peispective on Indefinite Term

Employment Contracts, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 837, 838-39.
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costly litigation whenever someone is discharged. They can also
counteract the risk of opportunistic behavior by employees; more
particularly, the right to discharge at will operates as an obstacle to
employee performance that falls well below what the employee is
able to do-a special virtue in light of the fact that shirking is both
hard to monitor and hard to prove to third parties.73 Thus the employer's right to discharge the employee at will might be seen to
complement the efficiency wage, with both operating to induce
good, rather than adequate, performance. Because operating a forcause system is likely to be expensive, and because its costs would
be ultimately felt by employees as well as employers,74 most employers, and most employees, are the beneficiaries of the at-will
rule. 5
For those who believe that at-will is the market-mimicking rule,
it is also important to emphasize that most employees are generally
unlikely to object to this rule. In a market economy, employers are
quite unlikely to fire employees for no reason. 6 It is costly to get
rid of good workers, and those who fire people for no reason will
have some trouble replacing them, partly because arbitrary discharges will have harmful reputational consequences, thus leading
prospective employees to seek work elsewhere. A separate point is
that many employees develop at least some degree of firm-specific
human capital: They are worth more to their own employer than
they are worth to other employers, because they have experience
with the firm and know something about its operations and expectations. Such firm-specific capital creates a safeguard against
arbitrary discharges.'
If employers generally would lose a great deal from a for-cause
system, and if employees generally would gain little, the at-will rule
stands adequately defended as a background rule that replicates
the likely result of bargaining. The only people who stand to gain
See Schwab, supra note 28, at 21-22.
Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, A Prelude to the Welfare State
64-69 (2000) (showing wage reductions after enactment of workers' compensation
7

74See

programs).
7- See James J. Heckman & Carmen Pages, The Cost of Job Security Regulation:
Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7773,2000).
76See Posner, supra note 60, at 358-59.
n See Schwab, supra note 28, at 21-25.
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from a for-cause system are marginal workers-prominently including those who deserve to be discharged for poor job
performance but who would be immunized, in practice though not
in law, by an at-will system.
2. Problems
However plausible, this argument is not obviously correct. It depends on a number of contentious empirical assumptions.
Suppose, for example, that a for-cause regime would not much
affect employer practices, because in any sensibly-designed system
discharge could occur at low cost whenever cause really existed,
and employers have little interest in discharging people for a reason other than cause.' If for-cause discharge is the ordinary
practice and if arbitrary discharges are infrequent, employees
should have little to lose from a legal rule that requires causeunless (and perhaps this is the key point) the cost of administering
a for-cause regime turns out to be high. But where cause exists,
employees would of course lose their suits in any case, and hence
they are unlikely to bring suit in the first place, especially in light of
the cost of doing so. A mechanism that pushes contests toward
low-cost resolution-such as arbitration-should ensure that employers have little to fear from a for-cause regime. For all these
reasons, it is unclear that employers would greatly prefer an at-will
system to a sensibly designed for-cause system.
At the same time, many employees might well care a great deal
about obtaining for-cause protection, if only to obtain immunity
from employer malice or mistake. We have seen that employee
concern is likely to be greatest in late career, when opportunistic
discharges become more probable; it is here that employers have
special incentives to discharge employees in violation of the implicit deal. But even earlier, employees are likely to be willing to
pay something for job security, or to require employers to pay
something to take it away. On this view, a for-cause regime might
be the best market-mimicking approach. The crucial empirical is-

'8This

appears to be the aspiration of the Montana system, which encourages

arbitration, and hence low-cost litigation. See Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-901 et. seq.
(1999).
7

See Schwab, supra note 28, at 19.
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sues here are, first, the cost of operating a for-cause system and,
second, the extent to which employees would actually be at risk in
an at-will system.
Because a final answer would depend on resolving those empirical issues, nothing said here demonstrates that a waivable workers'
right would be the market-mimicking solution-that such an approach would actually reflect the outcome of informed bargaining
by most employers and employees. But enough has been said to
show that any judgment on that point depends on empirical questions that cannot be answered a priori.
3. InformationalProblemsand the FairnessHeuristic
An additional weakness of the argument that an at-will system is
market-mimicking has to do with informational problems. The
most important point is that employees appear unaware that in the
face of contractual silence they are entering into an at-will arrangement. Even if they know the basic fact, they may not
understand exactly what it means. Here, then, is a third problem
with the conventional wisdom, illuminated by behavioral economics, though the mechanisms that account for employee ignorance
remain unclear.
Recent evidence, compiled by Pauline Kim, strongly suggests
that workers believe that employment is generally for cause, not at
will, and that discharge is therefore unlawful unless there is a jobrelated reason for it.' In Missouri, for example, Kim found that extremely strong majorities of employees-80% or more-believe
that the following grounds for discharge, entirely lawful in Missouri, are in fact unlawful: the employer wants to hire someone else
to do the same job; the employer mistakenly believes that the employee stole money; and the employer personally dislikes the
employee.8' Similar results were found in California and New York,
notwithstanding substantial variations in the law of the three
states.' Overwhelming majorities falsely believe that discharges

See Kim, Bargaining, supra note 28, at 105-06; see also Richard B. Freeman &
Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 118-21 (1999) (finding pervasive employee

ignorance about legal rights).
81See Kim, Bargaining, supra note 28, at 134 tbl.1.

12See Kim, Norms, supra note 28, at 451-52.
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that fall short of good cause are prohibited by law.' Kim also found
that worker ignorance cuts across distinctions that might be
thought to make a difference-not only geography, but also age,
work experience, and union experience. A more general survey
found the same results, with worker ignorance and excessive optimism extending well beyond the setting of job security.'
Why do workers misstate the law so systematically? It is possible
to provide both rational and quasi-rational explanations for worker
ignorance. As Kim notes, workers' beliefs to this effect might be
based on an understanding of workplace norms, rather than lawY
Perhaps the informal law of the workplace bars arbitrary discharges, even when state law does not.' This is certainly possible,
but is it obvious why workers would say that what employers can
do, as a matter of law, is the same as what they actually do, as a
matter of practice? People are usually capable of distinguishing
practices from rights. In places where incivility is absent or rare,
people know that incivility is absent or rare, but they do not believe that it is against the law. While workers' ignorance probably
has something to do with the perceived norms of the workplace,
this cannot be the whole explanation.'
Behavioral economics and cognitive psychology suggest alternative explanations. People tend to be optimists, and they often
engage in wishful thinking; they also like to reduce cognitive dissonance by drawing their beliefs about how things should be into

8The point casts doubt on Judge Posner's suggestion that in the context of job
security, there "are not the sort of information problems that might defeat
transactions over workplace safety, for discharges are not such rare events that
workers can't be expected to evaluate the risk rationally." Posner, supra note 60, at

359 (citations omitted). If workers believe that the legal rule already protects them,
they are unlikely to try to bargain for job security. As discussed below, there are other
problems with the suggestion that risks will be evaluated rationally in this context.
One of my principal points here is that claims like that of Judge Posner are empirical
ones, to be assessed empirically, and cannot be asserted a priori.
14See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 80, at 118-21.
81Kim, Norms, supra note 28, at 452.

See id. at 499-501.
SI See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 80, at 118-21 (finding erroneous optimism in
many contexts).
81See Shelley E. Taylor, Positive Illusions 10-11 (1989); Christine Jolls, Behavioral

Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1653, 1658-62
(1998) [hereinafter Jolls, Behavioral Economics].
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line with their views about how things are.' Sometimes people
might believe that the law is as they wish it to be. People are also
subject to self-serving bias; they care about fairness, but their
judgments about what is fair are systematically skewed in their own
direction.' Perhaps people believe that the law is generally fair,
and their judgments about what is fair lead to (mistaken) judgments about what the law is. But I suggest a more particular
hypothesis: People's beliefs about what the law is tend to reflect their
beliefs about what the law should be. In the absence of solid evidence that the law is otherwise, people will say that the law is what
they think it ought to be. The hypothesis remains to be tested.
For present purposes, the key point is simple. The fact that
workers believe that they have legal protection against arbitrary
discharge is devastating to the suggestion that an at-will default
rule accurately captures the shared understanding of the parties. In
fact the evidence is devastating to the at-will rule as conventionally
defended.9' Traditional understandings of workers' beliefs and motivations cannot easily account for workers' ignorance; behavioral
economics provides some clues.
D. The Information-ElicitingDefault Rule:
A Waivable Workers' Right
If we are uncertain about what rule would mimic the market, we
might seek a background rule that operates not to mimic the market but to elicit information-that imposes on one or another of
the parties the obligation to provide the crucial information to the
other side (and also to courts).' On which party should this burden
be imposed? It makes obvious sense to say that employers can
more cheaply propose a provision that will make matters clear. A
simple conclusion follows: If employers really would like a system
of at-will employment, then courts should say that the background
89See Taylor, supra note 88, at 25-28.

90Linda Babcock et al., Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in
Negotiations That Reflect a Self-Serving Bias, 111 Q.J. Econ. 1, 4 (1996).
9

1 This

is not to say that the rule cannot be defended in other terms. See, e.g.,

Heckman & Pag6s, supra note 75 (showing the harmful effect of job security
requirements).
9 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 94 (1989).
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rule is for-cause, simply to elicit a clear statement to this effect, so
that both parties to the contract know its real content. 93 Here, then,
is an effort to build employment law on a conventional efficiency
analysis, informed by a better understanding of workers' beliefs
and motivations.
In the abstract, this view might be defended simply on the
ground that the choice of the market-mimicking rule depends on
empirical issues that have not been resolved. Without evidence,
and without reason to believe that evidence would strongly support
one or another solution, an information-forcing rule seems best.
Kim's findings provide further support for this view. They demonstrate that employees do not know that this is the rule and
therefore do not enter into contracts with their eyes wide open.
They strongly support the suggestion that the appropriate background rule is for-cause, not to mimic the market, but so as to
ensure that employers furnish the relevant information to the employee, and obtain a waiver if they can.
The essential argument for a waivable workers' right to job security is now in place. We lack much ground for confidence about the
content of a market-mimicking rule. Lacking that confidence, a forcause regime seems best, as a way of forcing disclosure and overcoming what appears to be a lack of information on the part of
workers. If the argument is sound, it applies in many areas of labor
and employment law, as we shall shortly see.
E. DoctrinalSupport
These suggestions are not entirely without doctrinal support. In
the last two decades, courts have moved in the direction of creating
an information-forcing default rule for job security. While mere silence does not create a waivable workers' right, ambiguous
statements, plausibly interpreted as conferring job security, are often taken to prevent at-will discharge. If employers are to escape
that result, they must do so via a disclaimer that is exceedingly
clear. Here is another area in which we can find an implicit behavioral rationality in the emerging common law-a system of legal

See id. at 95.
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rules built on an accurate, rather than fanciful, sense of what workers are likely to know and how they are likely to react.
1. Old Law
For many decades, an apparent but ambiguous promise by an
employer would not create a contractual obligation to provide security.94 Employment manuals, for example, would not count as
part of any contractual relationship. In the same vein, a statement
by an employer or a personnel manager to the effect that the employee could work "as long as he did a good job," or
"permanently," would not provide a for-cause guaranty, at least if
it was unaccompanied by a defined term for employment.95
These results seem odd. They treat a promise that apparently
gives something to an employee as if it had no meaning at all. How
might the pattern of decisions be explained? One possibility is that
courts, in the relevant cases, are making a claim about the reasonable expectations of most workers who have heard statements of
this sort. Perhaps an employee who has been told that he has
"permanent" employment does not reasonably understand this as a
promise, rather than a hope or expectation.96 But a more interesting possibility is that courts are creating a kind of informationforcing default rule, to the effect that ambiguous statements will
not create a for-cause situation, and employees must obtain greater
clarity if this is in fact what they want. This seemingly harsh result
prevents both parties and judges from guessing about the meaning
of words that cannot really be taken at face value. An oral reference to permanent employment cannot mean that the employee
9'See Clarke v. Ati. Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423, 425 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908);
Comerford v. Int'l Harvester Co., 178 So. 894, 895-96 (Ala. 1938) ; see also Rothstein
et al., supra note 34, at 674-88 (discussing the old law and modem changes).
95See Rothstein et al., supra note 34, at 674-88.
more conventional argument would be that employers cannot be bound
because no contract exists unless both parties have manifested an intention to be
bound. But here, as elsewhere, the argument is a fake. If there is any background
rule, someone is going to be bound, whether or not an intention to be bound has been
manifested. Under a system of at-will employment, employees are bound, in the
sense that they can be fired for any reason, even though they have not manifested any
intention to be bound in that way. The idea that people cannot be bound unless they
have manifested an intention to be bound-the consent theory of contract-cannot be
made intelligible without a background theory of "natural" entitlements, which in this
context, is hard to generate.
9A
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will be allowed to work there forever; the statement must be qualified in various ways, and perhaps the court does not want to do the
qualifying on its own. Treating the statement as a kind of goal,
rather than a promise, prevents judicial guessing-games.
2. New Law
But the law has changed a great deal in the last two decades.
Courts have read employment manuals to create enforceable obligations, even when the relevant terms have ambiguity, as in a
statement that it is "the policy" of the company to fire people for
cause. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,7 for example, the
personnel manual said in general terms that it "is the policy of the
company to treat employees.., in a fair and consistent manner
and to release employees for just cause only."98 It was clear that
under long-standing law, this statement would not be sufficient to
overcome the at-will presumption, in part because no term of years
was identified. Nonetheless, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
this was sufficient to create an obligation of continued employment, even without a specified term of years." Other cases speak in
similar terms," ° and it is now clear that employment manuals can
create obligations. 0 '
Indeed, some cases have gone so far as to entrench the relevant
provisions, in the sense that once something like a promise has
been made, a disclaimer is unlikely to be effective unless it is exceptionally clear. Thus, for example, the Wyoming Supreme Court
was confronted with an employee handbook containing the following language: "READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING. I
agree that any offer of employment, and acceptance thereof, does
not constitute a binding contract of any length, and that such employment is terminable at the will of either party, subject to
appropriate state and/or federal laws. ' ' "° The court held that the
disclaimer was ineffective notwithstanding this express statement,
292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).

Id. at 903 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
91See id. at 885.
110See Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 724 P.2d 110, 117 (Haw. 1986); Duldulao

v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314,318 (Ill. 1987).

101See Rothstein et al., supra note 34, at 674-84.
102 McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, 820 P.2d 986, 988 (Wyo. 1991).
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for it "was not set off by a border or larger print, was not capitalized, and was contained in a general welcoming section of the
handbook."1" The court's decision is hardly unique. In a number of
cases, courts have said that disclaimers must be extremely clear."4
In addition, oral promises are frequently taken as binding, even
if they have a degree of ambiguity. Thus, for example, in Toussaint, 5 the court was confronted not only with personnel manuals
but also with allegations from the plaintiffs that they had been told
that they would be able to continue to work "as long as I did my
job," or "[I was] doing the job."1" In an alternative holding, the
court held that these statements were sufficient to justify an action
for wrongful discharge, even if a specific term of years was not
identified." Some cases find oral statements of this kind sufficient
to create a right not to be discharged without cause."
These cases might reflect a new understanding of the reasonable
expectations of employees when presented with statements of this
kind. Perhaps the modern cases reflect a belief that reasonable
employees think that such statements give them job security. But
the decisions might also be understood as a modest step in the direction suggested here: toward a waivable workers' right to job
security, on information-forcing grounds and based on a realistic
sense of what workers are likely to think when presented with
statements containing apparent promises. The employer is in the
best position to control the statements made to employees, and if
ambiguous statements are made, the employer ought to correct the
ambiguity so as to negate any employee belief that a for-cause arrangement has been created. The disclaimer cases fit this rationale
particularly well. They create a kind of consumer protection meas04

'

Id. at 989.

e.g., Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Wyo.
1988); Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989); Brown
v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 815 P.2d 72, 84 (Kan. 1991). To be sure, the
law is quite unruly here. See Bouwens v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 947 (Wyo. 1999)
(finding a disclaimer effective).
i, Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 890. Toussaint is read narrowly in Rowe v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991).
16 Toussaint,292 N.W.2d at 890.
107See id.
10See Rothstein et al., supra note 34, at 684-86. Generally, however, separate
consideration is required to make an oral statement binding.
104See,
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ure, saying that if there is any chance that the employee will misunderstand what he has been promised, it is the employer's job to
make an unambiguous correction. If a for-cause agreement is not
in the parties' interest, the employer can be expected to make corrections by notifying the employee of the situation in the clearest
possible terms.
It would not be a giant step from these cases to a waivable employees' right to job security. As we have seen, the evidence
suggests that ordinary employees, not told anything at all, are in
the same position as employees told that their employers' "policy"
is to retain them unless their performance is unsatisfactory.1" Employees typically believe that this is both policy and law. And if this
is the understanding of most employees, employers should be required to make a correction.'
II. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND ANTI-WAIVER
Thus far I have suggested that in the context of job security, a
waivable employers' right might be preferred over a waivable
workers' right, on the ground that the former may be the marketmimicking rule, but that without good evidence on that question, a
waivable workers' right seems better, because it is an informationforcing rule, defensible in light of what we know about what workers think. I have also suggested that the default rule will indeed
matter. But I have not discussed whether a nonwaivable workers'
right would be best of all. It is now time to explore that possibility.
A. UnequalBargainingPower and Redistribution
Many of those who challenge the at-will system stress the possible inequality of bargaining power between employers and (many)
employees. They suggest that a shift to a for-cause system would
produce a desirable form of redistribution to employees, particularly to the most vulnerable workers."' The reference to inequality
of bargaining power must mean that many of the deals between
119
See Kim, Bargaining, supra note 28, at 110-11.
OSee Issacharoff, supra note 30, at 1791-97; Peter Stone Partee, Note, Reversing
the Presumption of Employment At Will, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 689,710 (1991).
ISee Blades, supra note 21; Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev. 481, 518-32 (1976).
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employers and employees are harsh from the standpoint of the latter, and that the law should attempt to ensure a fairer arrangement.
We should certainly accept the claim of harshness, at least with respect to many of the relevant deals. Some employees have few
good options, and in these circumstances the best arrangement that
they can get is often quite harsh, even unfair, in the sense that they
are working very hard and receiving little in return. There is no
reason whatsoever to think that the market wage has any special
moral status.' It is important to find good ways to supplement
employment packages that turn out to be harsh or disadvantageous.
But the redistributive argument nonetheless stands on fragile
ground-not because the existing distribution of entitlements and
resources is good, but because blocking the exchange, through a
nonwaivable right to job security, is not the best way to produce
the desired redistribution. In fact, such a nonwaivable right might
not produce the desired redistribution at all. A nonwaivable workers' right to job security-and here is a general lesson for
employment law-is an unreliable method of redistributing resources to workers."' A for-cause provision does not directly
redistribute resources from employers to employees; instead it creates restructured deals, which may or may not benefit employees as
a class.
When mandatory for-cause provisions are imposed, someone
must pay for them. The burden may well fall on consumers, or
even workers themselves, in the form of lower wages, smaller retirement benefits, or lower employment on balance (through, for
example, more extended screening of job candidates, or refusals to

,12To some this will be a controversial claim. I will not defend it here.
113For an overview of the theoretical considerations, see Lawrence H. Summers,
Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers &
Proceedings) 177 (1989). For a recent discussion with special reference to benefits
limited to subgroups of workers, see Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 70.

The Earned Income Tax Credit is a far more direct way of redistributing resources to
poor workers. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Work v. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to
Employment Subsidies, 108 Yale L.J. 967,1048-56 (1999).
114 In the context of accommodation mandates, this proposition is severely qualified,
for as Jolls shows, there are conditions in which desired redistribution might well
occur. See Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 70, at 30-33.
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take risks by employing people in the first instance)."5 There can
be no assurance that any redistribution will make workers better
off as a class." 6 Workers might lose in salary or other benefits most
of, or as much as, they gain via the nonwaivable term"7 (with the
qualification that unionized workers appear to suffer from lower,
or no, wage offsets)."'
The redistributive argument for nonwaivable terms might be fortified with the suggestion that in individual bargaining, workers
face a collective-action problem that is best solved via law. John
Stuart Mill outlined the argument long ago, suggesting that with respect to a reduction in hours worked, the limitation
will not be adopted unless the body of operatives bind themselves to one another to abide by it .... For however beneficial
the observance of the regulation might be to the class collectively, the immediate interest of every individual would lie in
violating it: and the more numerous those were who adhered to
the rule, the more would individuals gain by departing from
it .... Assuming then that it really would be the interest of each
to work only nine hours if he could be assured that all others
would do the same, there might be no means of their attaining
this object but by converting their supposed mutual agreement

,"'A good overview is Summers, supra note 113.
116See id.; Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 64-69 (showing wage cuts after
enactment of workers' compensation programs). Note the possibility that workers
care not about absolute economic position but mostly or partly about relative
economic position; if this is true, nonwaivable workers' rights might be justified on the
ground that they provide a benefit, in the form of increased job security, while also
keeping relative economic position constant. See Robert H. Frank, Choosing the
Right Pond (1985); see also infra Part VI.
"7 For analyses finding substantial wage offsets, see Price V. Fishback & Shawn
Everett Kantor, Did Workers Pay for the Passage of Workers' Compensation Laws,
110 Q.J. Econ. 713, 736 (1995) ("Analysis of the effect of the introduction of workers'
compensation on wages shows that in the coal and lumber industries, workers
experienced substantial wage offsets. In the coal industry the offsets were large
enough to cover not only the expected monetary value of the benefits, but also the
employers' costs of purchasing the insurance to provide those benefits."); Jonathan
Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 622
(1994).
''See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 68-69 (showing no offsets in the
unionized sector).
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into an engagement under penalty, by consenting to have it enforced by law.9
Mill's suggestion is sufficient to show that, with respect to any
particular contract term, workers who are currently employed at a
firm might do better with a nonwaivable legal constraint than
without one. But it does not show that with respect to contracts as
a whole, the nonwaivable right helps workers as a class. As an argument that nonwaivable terms promote redistribution, Mill's
argument faces two problems. First, and as noted, the compensation package might be adjusted to the detriment of workers; it is
even possible that workers will lose in wages what they gain in reduced hours and that the resulting package might be worse from
their point of view." Second, the result of the nonwaivable term
might well be to decrease employment, even if-indeed precisely
because-current workers are made better off."' The decrease in
employment is a serious problem from the distributive point of
view, especially because the people who are thrown into joblessness are likely to be among the least advantaged members of
society.
These points do not demonstrate that nonwaivable terms are indefensible as a means of producing desirable redistribution."
Perhaps the wage offset will be less than 100%; in the building
trades sector, for example, there appears to have been no wage offset as a result of workers' compensation legislation." Perhaps the
adverse effect on unemployment will be low and justified in light of
the benefits of the nonwaivable term for larger classes of people;
perhaps the problem of increased unemployment can be taken care
of through other means. My conclusion is not that nonwaivable

119Mill, supra note 17, at 350-51.
120See the evidence of substantial

wage offsets for workers' compensation and
parental leave, sources cited supra note 117. But see the relative position problem,
taken up infra Part VI.
- See Heckman & Pagds, supra note 75. On the ambiguous evidence that labor
unions increase compensation packages while also decreasing employment, see
Freeman & Medoff, supra note 15, at 21, 43-60.
1"See Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 70, at 257 (discussing the
circumstances in which desirable redistribution will occur from accommodation
mandates).
123See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 117, at 734.
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terms are always indefensible on redistributive grounds." It is that
the case for such terms, on those grounds, is fragile and depends on
highly uncertain empirical issues.
B. The Problem of Information, With Notes from
BehavioralEconomics
One possible reason to create nonwaivable workers' rights is to
respond to inadequate information on the part of workersinadequate information that cannot, realistically speaking, be corrected with information alone. We have seen that shifting the
entitlement to the worker, while maintaining freedom of contract,
is a way of counteracting worker ignorance." But this may not be
sufficient. If workers are allocated the right, but asked to waive it,
will they know what they are doing? This is an empirical question,
and it lacks an obvious answer.
1. IntransigentIgnorance
With respect to job security, there is evidence that workers will
not believe that a waiver is effective even if they are asked to sign
it. The most striking evidence here comes from Kim's study. 2 Kim
asked employees to evaluate the effects of a personnel manual
providing that the employer "reserves the right to discharge employees at any time, for any reason, with or without cause." 127 In
New York, California, and Missouri, this kind of provision eliminates any employer obligation. Nonetheless, in all three states
24

It is generally agreed that regulation via a nonwaivable term is inferior to
regulation via a redistributive income tax. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polisnky, An
Introduction to Law and Economics 105-13 (1983); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,

Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667 (1994). It is possible, though, that the choice is not
between these two options, but between no redistribution at all and regulation via a
nonwaivable term.

- It is also possible to think that job security, like safety, is a public good, in the
sense that it cannot be provided to one employee without simultaneously being
provided to many; job security requires procedures to test the legitimacy of
termination, and these procedures are a public good. See Weiler, supra note 7, at 75.
To keep the discussion from becoming unwieldy, I defer it until a treatment of the
issue of safety.
26See

supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
Kim, Norms, supra note 28, at 465 (quotation marks omitted).

127

HeinOnline -- 87 Va. L. Rev. 240 2001

2001]

Human Behaviorand the Law of Work

241

about three-quarters of respondents believed that a pure costsaving discharge would be unlawful notwithstanding the disclaimer."
It would be possible to respond to such evidence by endorsing a
mandatory for-cause regime. Perhaps employees simply cannot be
adequately informed of an employer's decision to purchase the
relevant entitlement. The point may be right. But if the costs of a
mandatory regime are very high for employers and workers alike,
we have not defended it even if workers' ignorance is intractable. If
the costs are high, and workers and employers will both lose, the
at-will rule is likely to be best in any event. The best strategy might
be to require extremely clear language so as to ensure that waivers
are voluntary and knowing, as, for example, through strong verbs
and specific language.'29 This approach would not ensure full information, but it would move things in the right direction, and do
so without introducing the possibly substantial costs of a mandatory for-cause regime.
2. Excessive Optimism
I have noted that people tend to be risk optimists;" 0 they believe
that they are peculiarly immune from probabilistic harms faced by
others. For example, 90% of drivers believe that they are safer
than the average driver and less likely to be involved in a serious
accident. 3 ' Perhaps workers who waive their rights will believe,
wrongly, that they are peculiarly immune from the risk to which
they are subjecting themselves. If so, waivers will be inadequately
informed. But it is not clear how to respond to this possibility.
Probably the best remedy is not to ban waiver, but to inform employees in the clearest possible terms, so as to ensure that they are
made aware that the risks are ones that they themselves will face.

1s Id.

id. at 465 n.63 (citing Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi -McLean Parks,
Contract Formation and Employee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological, and Empirical
Analyses, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 647, 674-77 (1994)).
See Taylor, supra note 88, at 32-33; Jolls, Behavioral Economics, supra note 88,
at 1659-63.
129See

3

131See

Taylor, supra note 88, at 10-11.
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3. InadequateForesight
Signing contracts before the fact, workers may not have a good
sense of what is in their long-term interest.13 They might be myopic
or short-sighted. Recent evidence so suggests. 33 This is another
kind of information failure, one that might also argue against allowing waiver.
Consider an example. We have seen that the endowment effect
means that those who have a benefit are likely to value it more
than those who do not. Oddly, however, it appears that people do
not anticipate the endowment effect. In simple studies, people did
not see that they would value mundane goods, such as coffee mugs,
far more if those goods were initially allocated to them." Apparently people do not quite anticipate how bad it will be to lose
something they once had. As Samuel Issacharoff has suggested, a
possible conclusion is that workers will be in a poor position to decide whether or not to waive their rights, because they will not
know, before the fact, how bad it would be to lose their jobs.'35 If
this is so, waiver might be banned in workers' own interests.
This problem might be reduced within a system of waivable
workers' rights. In such a system, the presumptive right is with employees, not employers, and hence the endowment effect need not
be imagined. On the other hand, it may be quite hard for employees, at the time of signing the agreement, to have a full
appreciation of what it is that they may be losing.'36 Workers may
not sufficiently bargain to retain a legal right of some sort, simply

- Thus John Stuart Mill, no friend of government interference with freedom of
contract, went so far as to suggest that an
exception to the doctrine that individuals are the best judges of their own
interest, is when an individual attempts to decide irrevocably now, what will be
best for his interest at some future and distant time. The presumption in favour

of individual judgment is only legitimate, where the judgment is grounded on
actual, and especially on present, personal experience; not where it is formed
antecedently to experience, and not suffered to be reversed even after

experience has condemned it.
Mill, supra note 17, at 345.
133See Bewley, supra note 3, at 268-70 (discussing worker myopia).
See id.; George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes,
105 Econ. J. 929, 934-36 (1995).
13-See Issacharoff, supra note 30, at 1801.
See id.
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because they may not know how important, for example, continuation in a particular job will be to them.
4. "EditingOut"
People sometimes "edit out" events that have very low probability, even if the ultimate impact of the event is quite large, partly
because of simplified "decisional paths" used for choices having
multiple attributes.137 The terms of employment contracts are numerous, and it is unlikely that most employees will be able to focus
on more than a few of them. In fact protection against arbitrary
discharge seems to be a low priority item for most employees, notwithstanding its potential importance." There may be an analogy
here with disaster insurance; people tend not to purchase disaster
insurance (for floods and tornados, for example) even when the
benefits of doing so clearly seem to exceed the costs. 39
These various points hardly create a devastating argument on
behalf of a system of nonwaivable employees' rights. They raise,
first, a number of empirical questions about what is likely to produce waivers and, second, a number of normative questions about
how to handle employee mistakes. Any judgment about whether to
allow waivers will depend largely on comparing the likely costs of a
nonwaivable rule against the likely costs of employee ignorance
and mistake. If it is possible to design a nonwaivable rule with low
costs of administration-as perhaps Montana has done"speculations about employee ignorance may well be sufficient to
carry the day. If, on the other hand, a nonwaivable rule will create
serious problems, the speculations should require stronger empirical support before they can be made decisive.
C. Between Waivable and Nonwaivable: ConstrainedWaivers
Even if the various objections to waiver are taken to have substantial force, it does not follow that waiver should be banned. A
more flexible approach would allow waiver, but only under certain
137Id.

- See id.
9
13
See Howard Kunreuther, Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons
102-03 (1978).
140See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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constraints, perhaps in the form of floors on what employees may
be allowed to trade in return for waiving their rights. On this approach, the relevant right would be "commodified" in the sense
that it could be traded on the market, but to protect employees
against an absence of information waivers, would be constrained. It
is easy to imagine intermediate solutions.
1. ProceduralConstraints
At one extreme, the law could provide that a waiver is acceptable, but not simply when an employee has signed an agreement to
waive. The waiver must be shown to be fully informed, perhaps
limited to instances where it is accompanied by clear language and
a cooling-off period in which the employee is permitted to reconsider and, if he so desires, to consult a lawyer. Consider this a
procedural constraint on waivers. A legal constraint of this kind
could be designed to furnish information, directly and indirectly, by
imposing requirements intended to signal the magnitude of the discussion. A procedural constraint on waiver could be minimal or
much more than that.
The general idea has clear antecedents in current law. Under the
common law as now understood, employer disclaimers must be extremely clear and conspicuous; explicit language is not enough.
Under the ADEA, a similar approach is taken to waivers of antidiscrimination rights. For rights and claims arising before execution
of the waiver, the statute permits waiver so long as it is "knowing
and voluntary."14' If it is, the waiver is an affirmative defense. To
count as knowing and voluntary, the waiver must specifically refer
"to rights or claims arising under" the ADEA;4 the employee
must be advised in writing to consult with an attorney before executing the agreement; 3 the employee must be given "at least 21
days within which to consider the agreement"; 1" and the agreement
must provide for a minimum of a seven day post-execution revocation period. 5 Most of these provisions also apply to waivers in

14129 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (1994).

Id. §626(f)(1)(B).
Id. §626(f)(1)(E).
'Id.
§626(f)(1)(F)(ii).
Id. § 626(O(1)(G).
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settlement of charges filed with the EEOC. 146 These provisions of
the ADEA are models of a procedurally constrained waiver."7
2. Substantive Constraints
At another extreme, waiver might be deemed acceptable, but
only at a price determined by government, not at a price determined by the market. Here, there is a substantive constraint on
waivers. Substantive constraints, like procedural ones, might be
minimal or much more.
This approach also has a place in contemporary employment
law. An example is the Fair Labor Standards Act, which allows
employees to waive their right not to work more than forty hours a
week, but only at a governmentally determined premium (time and
a half),'" Or consider the Model Employment Termination Act,
which allows employers and employees to waive the right to forcause discharge, but only on the basis of an agreement by the employer to provide a severance payment in the event of a discharge
not based on poor job performance. 49 This severance payment consists of one month's salary for every year of employment and,
interestingly, is therefore targeted to longevity of service in a way
that maps onto the employees' likely growing stake in their jobs.
For those who are skeptical of both simple market waivers and
government mandates, these various approaches supply a model in
the form of a system of substantive constraints, designed to ensure
that the employee is given something of definite value in return for
waiver.
D. How To Handle Job Security
I have been attempting to work through issues of job security
from a perspective informed by behavioral economics. The most
important goal is to increase understanding of the underlying issues, not to recommend any particular reform. Nothing I have said
suggests that courts should declare that contracts are presumed to
' Id. § 626(0(2).
47Waivers may not apply to rights or claims that arise after the date the waiver is
executed; here, waiver is entirely blocked. Id. § 626(f)(1)(C).
143
See 29 U.S.C. § 207(f) (1994).
49See Model Employment Termination Act, supra note 54, § 4(c).
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contain an implied term for job security. An obvious reason is that
judicial activity of this kind would disrupt long-standing understandings on which many people have relied. To be sure, job
security is an issue that has been resolved to a large degree by the
common law. But when people have organized their relationships
on the basis of one understanding, the presumption should be in
favor of maintaining the status quo. Another problem is that courts
cannot alone devise an important part of a sensible for-cause system: a simple, low-cost mechanism for resolving disputes about
whether cause exists. By encouraging arbitration, as Montana has
done,1" a legislature can ensure that the consequence of any forcause rule is not disastrous for either employers or employees.
Even a waivable workers' right could produce serious problems if
unaccompanied by a system that ensures that disputes are handled
inexpensively. Because a shift in the default rule would have a disruptive effect on worker-employer relations, it probably should not
be imposed by the judiciary alone.
There are substantive concerns as well. A waivable right of this
kind would impose nontrivial transaction costs for those who seek
waiver, and these costs will have to be borne by someone, perhaps
consumers and workers themselves. If workers would generally
waive, what is the point? The best answer is that we do not know if
workers would generally waive, and without knowing whether they
would, the point is to test the market by ensuring that waivers are
informed. But under certain assumptions, it would make sense to
favor an at-will background rule simply because of distrust of
workers' refusal to waive, which might itself be inadequately informed-a product of some combination of confusion and
alarmism. Perhaps workers would be unwilling to sell their right to
job security, even at a fully reasonable price, and that unwillingness
might not be in their best interests. On this view, the endowment
effect, combined with employee ignorance, would lead employees
to demand an exceedingly high premium for waiver, and the consequence would be adverse effects on workers themselves.'51 If
110
See supra note 78.
5 Compare the controversy over genetic engineering of food. Should geneticallyengineered food be labeled as such? At first glance, the answer is yes; consumers
should be informed of what they are eating. But what if genetically-engineered food is
harmless, and consumers believe that it is dangerous? In these circumstances, labeling
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workers would systematically overvalue job security, the at-will
rule finds support-rather than a challenge-from an understanding of human cognition. This is a plausible speculation but no more
than that; it too requires empirical testing.
I conclude with two proposals. First, courts should build on
existing law so as to take ambiguous terms as an occasion to
require employers to negate any possible worker inference of job
security. Second, some state legislatures should experiment with a
waivable workers' right. An approach of this sort would be more
cautious and modest than the Montana solution, which appears not
to have created serious problems."
I.

WORKERS' ENTITLEMENTS AND THE PROBLEM OF WAIVER

The analysis thus far might be applied to many areas of employment and labor law. I offer a large number of examples here,
not to resolve any of them authoritatively, but to show the generality of the foregoing analysis of entitlements in employment, and
also to explore the attractiveness of waivable workers' rights in
various settings.
There are, however, potential differences between the contract
at will situation and other contexts in which the legal system might
choose among waivable employers' rights, waivable workers'
rights, nonwaivable workers' rights, and constrained waivers.
These include the existence of third-party effects as a result of
some waivers; the possibility that the reform in question is attempting to change norms and preferences, rather than to take them as
given; and the fact that some workplace benefits require employers
to produce local public goods, for which individual bargaining is
unreliable.
A. OccupationalSafety and Health
Under federal law, workers are given certain safeguards against
hazardous and unsafe conditions in the workplace.153 But the relecould actually impair people's welfare, possibly even their health; in fact, accurate
labels could even make people, in a sense, less informed.
'2

See Bruce Ellis Fein, Employment Effects of Montana's For-Cause Discharge

Law (May 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association).
'

29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
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vant rights are not waivable. Should workers be allowed to make
trades with their employers? Suppose that employees would willingly trade a certain level of safety in return for other benefits, such
as cash, health care, or leisure time. Ought the law to authorize the
trade? Recall that the redistributive objection to waiver rests on
fragile grounds, because it is far from clear that if adequately informed workers are willing to waive their rights, workers as a
whole would be better off if they were banned from doing so.
In an essay in very much the same spirit as this one, Susan RoseAckerman has suggested a mixed answer to this question, involving
a two-tiered approach to protection of workers." She proposes
that the federal government should issue rules governing legal minima that would not be waivable, because they would reflect levels
of safety that reasonable workers would not wish to relinquish."5
At the same time, Rose-Ackerman suggests that OSHA should issue "benchmark standards," more protective than the legal
minima, that workers could waive for compensation.'56 The waivers
might be agreed upon individually or collectively, via unions or
other representative structures.
The proposal has many virtues. By calling for certain nonwaivable minima for truly dangerous conditions, it responds to
potential problems with inadequately informed waivers. At the
same time, the proposal grants workers a presumptive right to extra protection; the endowment effect should ensure that workers
do not relinquish that right for little or nothing. To those who fear
that workers will waive their right to safety for too little, it might
be responded that safety cannot be assessed through some "off-on"
switch. The question is the appropriate degree of safety; informed
people can sensibly resolve that question in different ways, trading
degrees of safety in return for other goods. Moreover, expensive
safety regulation can be harmful to both workers' incomes and to
1
their healthh.
To the extent that such regulation decreases wages,
increases unemployment, or otherwise reduces wealth, it can pro-

L'

See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 8, at 358-60.

See id. at 359.
'MId.

"-7 See Robert H. Hahn et al., Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? 7-9, 15-22
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 298-317 (1997);
Symposium, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 5 (1994).
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duce mortality and morbidity increases as well.' The central question is whether cognitive and motivational problems will lead
workers to waive their rights for too little. If the set of nonwaivable
minima is adequate, and if the initial grant of the right goes to
workers, there is good reason to experiment with a two-tiered approach of this kind.
B. Age Discrimination
The ADEA forbids employers from discriminating against anyone who is over forty years of age; it also bans mandatory
retirement practices.' Through these provisions, it creates an obvious incentive for employers to devise a retirement package by
which older workers might be encouraged to leave the workforce.
Although such packages might be deemed a form of age discrimination, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which such a package
is in the mutual interest of employer and employee.
Suppose, for example, that the employee is generally interested
in retiring but would not do so without some kind of financial cushion. Suppose too that the employer wants to replace the older
worker with a younger one, believing that the younger worker will
produce substantial productivity gains, at least in the long term. Incentives for early retirement seem a natural and mutually
beneficial solution and were a widespread response to the
ADEA.'" To make the deal worthwhile, employers seek both retirement and a promise not to sue for violations of the ADEA.
Congress eventually enacted the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act' 6' ("OWBPA"), which authorizes knowing and voluntary waivers. Because OWBPA does not permit employees to waive rights
that postdate the execution of the waiver, it does not amount to the
kind of waivable workers' right that I have been discussing here.
Instead it permits something like a settlement of a preexisting
claim; the settlement operates as a waiver. The question therefore
becomes why employers are not permitted to ask for waivers be-

1-1See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 302-05.
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-631(1994).
160See Linda Carleton Messinger, Voluntary Acceptance of Early Retirement
Offers: Golden Handshake or Gilded Shove?, 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 797, 803-09 (1988).
6129 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994).
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fore the unlawful activity occurs. Why shouldn't employers be allowed to obtain a waiver of a right to bring suit for alleged age
discrimination, if employees are willing to agree?
Christine Jolls has suggested that prospective waivers should indeed be allowed.62 On her view, the ADEA has, as one of its
central purposes, the prevention of opportunistic discharges, which
occur when employers discharge employees in late-career, in violation of an implicit promise to provide continued benefits. The
statute therefore has a hands-tying rationale that ensures enforcement of these contracts in spite of employers' incentives to act
opportunistically. This is an efficiency argument for the ADEA,
but there is a parallel efficiency case for allowing the workers' right
to be waivable. On Jolls' view,
the basic efficiency argument in favor of prospective waivers is
that they allow parties for whom age-based wages are not desirable-or at least not sufficiently desirable to warrant the costs
of imposing legal liability for cost-based decisions about older
workers-to avoid unnecessary and costly regulation of their
private affairs. 63
There is, however, a potential problem here: myopic behavior by
workers. As Jolls acknowledges, young workers are in a poor position to assess the harms possibly to be incurred by their future
selves several decades hence."6 The possibility of myopia may be a
sufficient ground to bar waiver. In principle, it does seem unlikely
that waivers of the right to be free from age discrimination would
be adequately informed. If waivers are nonetheless to be permitted-as I think they should be-it is because freedom from age
discrimination is unlikely greatly to benefit workers, and hence the
resulting deals are unlikely to hurt workers on balance."6
C. Vacation, Leave Time, and Health Care
A great deal of attention has recently been given to various proposals to improve workers' lives through longer vacations,
extended leave time, and better health care benefits. The obvious
6 See Jolls, Hands-Tying, supra note 44, at 1845.
'63 Id.
1 See id.
5 See Richard A. Posner, Aging and Old Age 319-63 (1995).
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objection is that statutory mandates would impose a kind of rigid,
one-size-fits-all approach on diverse workplaces, and that the best
approach is to allow people to bargain. A system of mandatory
health insurance, for example, might lead to reductions in wages
and other benefits. It should now be clear that this criticism is quite
reasonable." If employees would like to sacrifice vacation and
leave time, or health care benefits, in return for other elements of a
compensation package, is it so clear that they should not be permitted to do so? Note here that good wages are both good for
workers' health, and that good wages can be used to purchase education and health care for children. Does the analysis of job
security strengthen or weaken the case for a waivable workers'
right, or even a nonwaivable workers' right, for interests of this
sort?
The contract at will situation has a special feature not present
here: empirical evidence that workers believe that they already
have the right in question. We lack evidence showing that workers
believe that employers are obliged to provide them with vacation,
or leave time, or health care. Perhaps they do; this is a worthy area
for empirical study. But even if they do not, there are good reasons
to ensure that if workers are not going to have these rights, they
are made expressly aware of that fact. The natural proposal is that
workers have waivable rights to a certain level of vacation and
leave time and health care protection-and that employers are able
to purchase these rights for a fee.
It is possible that workers will relinquish these rights too cheaply
or that collective action problems will induce workers to act against
their best interests. For reasons discussed above, this argument
cannot be said to be wrong, but it rests on fragile grounds. It is possible that workers lack the information to give fully knowing
waivers; it is also possible that a form of myopia will produce impulsive action. But these too are speculations. As in the context of
occupational safety and health, the best response would be to produce nonwaivable minima along with procedural or substantive
constraints on the waiver of rights that exceed those minima. What
'1 See sources cited supra note 117. In their book, however, Fishback & Kantor
find that the workers' compensation program responded well to problems in the
private insurance market, and benefits workers. See Fishback & Kantor, supra note
117, at 70-74.
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I am generally envisioning, in short, is a two-tiered system in which
workers are provided with a floor below which no workplace may
go, together with a set of waivable rights that respond to the legitimate claim that one size does not fit all. Of course it would be
necessary to say a great deal more in order to grapple with the details.
D. ParentalLeave
In 1991 the United States adopted, for the first time, a statute
requiring employers to provide parental leave. 67 The Family and
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") requires employers to allow employees up to twelve total weeks of leave during any twelve-month
period, if the reason for the leave is to care for a newborn child, to
care for a spouse, son, daughter, or parent with a serious health
problem, or because of a serious health problem of the employee's
own.1" Employers are not required to allow employees to continue
to work at a reduced rate, nor are they required to pay employees
during the time off. The basic idea is that an employee will not lose
her job if she takes leave for one of the stated reasons.
The most notable feature of this legislation is that in one bold
stroke, it transforms a waivable employers' right into a nonwaivable workers' right. Is the legislation desirable? It is tempting to
think that it is, because it gives employees an important right that
they would otherwise be denied in many cases. Undoubtedly numerous employees are now spending time with their families under
circumstances in which this would have been difficult or impossible
prior to FMLA-a large gain. But-our now-familiar theme-this
is no simple transfer of resources from employers to employees,
and an obvious question is who really bears the costs of parental
leave legislation. There is some evidence that those who bear the
costs are likely to be the same as those who receive the benefitsthat parental leave legislation results in a proportional wage reduction for its beneficiaries, mostly women." If this is the case, is the
statute undesirable for that reason? On one view, it certainly is.
The government has simply forced workers to receive in leave time
16729

U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).

'IsSee id. § 2612.
10 See Gruber, supra note 117, at 124-28.
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what they would otherwise have received in income. Having been
given the opportunity to contract for this fight, workers chose not
to do so, receiving higher salary and other benefits instead. If
workers? choices reflect their best interests, the restructured deal,
with parental leave but probably with a lower salary, is not going to
benefit workers.
But by now it should be clear that this argument is not decisive.'
Workers may be myopic in failing to seek parental leave protections, especially in light of the fact that before having a child, it is
hard to have a full and vivid sense of the demands that arise once
the child is born. For many workers, there may be no self-conscious
thought about parental leave at all; this may be edited out at the
time that employment is sought. As in the context of the contract
at will, both employers and employees may face a signaling problem. Employers who offer parental leave may find themselves
attracting a disproportionate number of workers who want to take
such leave; employees who ask about leave policies in advance may
be signaling that they are not entirely committed to the workforce.
Indeed, workers may face a widespread norm against asking for or
taking parental leave, and they may not even know that this norm
is something that it is possible to challenge. In any case, parental
leave policies can be defended, not principally as protecting workers, but as protecting children and others for whom workers would
like to care. If there are third-party effects, the case for a
nonwaivable right is greatly strengthened.
At first glance, these considerations would seem to be reasons
for transferring the entitlement from employer to employee, and
even for disallowing waivers. But they are not decisive. Children's
interests are not entirely clear-cut: If parental wages fall as a result
of parental leave legislation, children will be correspondingly hurt.
In the general run of cases, there is probably little reason to think
that parents will not consider the well-being of their children in deciding whether and how much leave time to demand at the time
they are hired. Whether workers are in a poor position to make
that balance in advance cannot be decided a priori. To be sure, a
170

For an illuminating treatment of some of the complexities here, see generally
Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 70 (discussing the effect of

accommodation mandates on wage and employment levels).
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real problem is that in initial bargaining, workers are unlikely to be
thinking about parental leave. 7' But it would be possible to remedy
this problem by giving employees the relevant right, and by allowing them to trade it if and only if the employers make the trade
worth their while. It makes sense here to consider a two-tiered system, combining statutory minima with a more ample set of
waivable rights.
E. Workers' Compensation
All states now provide workers' compensation programs. Moreover, the right to benefit from such programs is not waivable.
Workers enter the employment relationship with assurance that in
the event of accident, they will receive appropriate compensation.
Workers' compensation programs do not merely have ex post consequences. They also have substantial incentive effects, leading
employers to act to reduce accidents and injuries. Indeed, there is
reason to think that workers' compensation programs are more effective-actually far more effective-than OSHA regulations in
improving workplace safety."7
By themselves, however, these points do not justify making
workers' compensation programs nonwaivable. As in the context
of parental leave legislation, there is evidence that workers' wages
are cut correspondingly; what they receive from the program, in
the event that they need it, is what they lose in wages.173 In these
circumstances, why shouldn't workers be able to waive the relevant
rights? If they did, they would be self-insurers, and self-insurance,
so long as it is genuinely voluntary, is not an obviously implausible
model for workplace injuries."
The familiar answers might be given here. Workers may lack the
information that would make a waiver sufficiently informed, perhaps because of myopia, excessive optimism, or dissonance
reduction. But there is an independent issue: Workers who do not
wish to waive their rights may face a special kind of collective ac171Compare the discussion of severance benefits in Bewley, supra note 3, at 268-69
(explaining why workers do not seek severance pay).
72 See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 178 (1991).
173See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 117, at 714.
14But see Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 70-74 (describing problems in
private insurance market).

HeinOnline -- 87 Va. L. Rev. 254 2001

2001]

Human Behavior and the Law of Work

255

tion problem, and this problem may well justify a nonwaivable
workers' right.175 More particularly, there is a distinctive free rider
problem in this context. To see this, return to the fact that the consequence of workers' compensation programs is to lead employers
to increase safety in the workplace. The increases often happen because employers introduce capital improvements designed to
reduce deaths and injuries.17 6 To the extent that these would have
been made in any case, employees who waive their rights for a fee
will receive many of the protections of the program without paying
for it. It is here that there is a problem. If safety is a local private
good-something that, when provided to some, will also be provided to all-rational individual choices by workers are likely to
lead to a large number of waivers and hence fail to create incentives to increase safety. This, then, is an area where the argument
for creating a nonwaivable workers' right is especially strong."7
F. Unionization:Company Unions, Ordinary Unions
What of the right to unionize itself? Should that right be waivable? By whom? These issues are best approached by dividing the
inquiry into three issues: individual waivers of the right to unionize;
appropriate default rules for union status; and collective waivers of
the right not to be faced with company-dominated unions.
1. Nonwaivable IndividualEmployee Rights
The rights guaranteed by the Wagner Act, 78 the foundation of
modern labor law, are not waivable by individual employees. 9
Employers may not buy the right to fire employees who join unions
as through, for example, the "yellow dog" contract. The rights to
join a union, to strike, and to engage in activity for mutual aid and
protection are not subject to waiver. Why does the statute make
this choice, rather than creating a system of waivable employees'
rights?
175On

related problems, see id.

176See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 8, at 359-60 (discussing safety as a local public

good).
17 See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 70-74 (describing problems in private
insurance market for workers).
17829 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1994).
179See id. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3).
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There is no obvious answer.'" One justification would rely on
some combination of the behavioral grounds described above, involving informational, cognitive, and motivational problems.
Perhaps many workers would not know what they were waiving,
especially in light of the possibility that the potential benefits of unionization would not be readily apparent at the time the waiver was
requested. Perhaps both employers and individual workers would
face a signaling problem akin to that which could arise if, in an atwill regime, an employer emphasizes that it will provide job security, and thus attracts marginal workers, or an employee requests
the same, and thus signals a realistic risk that the employer will
want to fire him.
2. Unions at All? The CurrentPresumptionAgainst
This system of nonwaivable workers' rights coexists with what is,
from the standpoint of the real-world status of unions, probably
even more important-the basic background set by a crucial waivable employers' right. No collective representative is in place until
employees have affirmatively voted for it. The ordinary assumption
of the workplace, and hence the default rule, is nonunion. The
situation that workers face is one in which organization must be
sought, through the processes of union election. Nothing is inevitable or natural about this situation. On the contrary, this "tilt has its
roots in the common law background.., the tacit legal assumption
that the 'natural' status for a workplace is nonunion, with management exercising on behalf of the shareholder-owners the
prerogatives of property and contract law to establish the firm's
terms and conditions of employment. 1 .. It is easy to imagine an
unusual regime, in which workers are presumed to favor collective
organization, but in which they are permitted to vote otherwise. If
union representation is thought to have significant advantages, a
system of this sort might well be preferred.
Many variations are possible. On one approach, workers would
start employment with a presumption in favor of collective organi-

1°It is possible that the prohibition solves a collective action problem. For
discussion, see Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Minimum Contract Terms, with
Implications
for Labor Law, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1741, 1749-51,1756-65 (1996).
81
Weiler, supra note 7, at 228.
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zation. A vote would help to choose the particular form of that organization, including the particular union that would represent
workers; at the same time, employees could be asked to reject the
option of collective organization if they could be convinced that
this is in their best interests. An advantage of this approach is that
it could help overcome the effects of management tactics, many of
them unlawful, to overcome unionization."n Another advantage is
that this approach would work like an information-forcing default
rule. If we are unsure whether failures of unionization stem from
worker preferences or from employer pressure, a presumption in
favor of collective organization would help untangle that issue.
And to the extent that such organization confers benefits on workers without imposing correlative costs," there is much to be said
for enlisting the endowment effect on its behalf. In contrast, if collective organization is thought to produce few real benefits for
organized workers, and at the same time to increase both prices
and unemployment, the existing default rule would stand on firm
ground. What is most important is to see that the default rule
represents a choice among a range of options and that it is likely to
have extremely important effects; any such rule has to be defended
against reasonable alternatives.
3. Company Unions
Some of the most important and interesting issues in contemporary employment law arise as a result of the statutory ban on
employer-sponsored workers' organizations." Employers are not
allowed to create labor organizations, even if employees would be
satisfied with them-apparently on the theory that employersponsored labor organizations cannot be trusted to protect employee interests.' The theory seems to be that the employer
should be on only one side of the negotiating table, not on both
- See id. at 230.
3

This is the theme of Freeman & Medoff, supra note 15, at 246-51.

-See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).

1 See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 753

(1994); Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 125 (1994).
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sides. Thus Senator Wagner emphasized the coercion and deception involved in the use of company-dominated unions, with the
suggestion that such organizations actually served the employers'
interests, not those of workers. Hence the statutory prohibition was
(and is) defended with reference to a fear of employer coercion, a
belief that employees lack the information to make ex ante waivers, a risk of deceptive practice on the part of employers, and a
perception that workers' preferences, in this context, may be adaptive to an unjust status quo.
In theory, these objections may have made sense in the 1930s,
when company unions were primary tools in union avoidance, and
were commonly used as part of a package of union-busting tactics.
But in the last two decades, circumstances have changed in two
important ways."s First, private sector unions have dramatically declined, and hence the real choice is not between unions and
company-supported substitutes, but between no union and a company-supported substitute. It is hardly clear that no organization at
all is best for workers. Second, there has been a sharp decline in
Taylorist conceptions of the workplace, which posit a sharp split
between "brainwork" and the highly mechanical work of ordinary
laborers." There is a great deal of new interest, on the part of employers themselves, in finding ways to increase the role of
employees in designing more efficient workplaces, partly because
this step increases worker satisfaction, and partly because it appears to have desirable effects on production. The consequence of
these two developments has been to impose sharp pressure on the
prohibition of employer-sponsored unions.
Suppose, for example, that an employer wants to create some
kind of employee organization to improve efficiency, safety, and
working conditions. Under current law, this step is likely forbidden."s The relevant right cannot be waived by workers acting
individually or even collectively. But suppose that workers have
thought long and hard about the issue, and have decided that they
would do better with a company union than without collective representation or with an ordinary union. The conventional response
198
1 borrow here from Estreicher, supra note 185, at 134-36.
197See sources cited supra note 185.

I's See Electromation v. NLRB, 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 992, 995-97 (1992), enforced, 35
F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
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here is that the employees' judgment to this effect cannot be
trusted because the result of a company union is to place the employer on both sides of the bargaining table. In this view, the ban
on company unions is designed to ensure against a kind of deceptive packaging-the appearance without the reality of collective
representation-and at the same time to counteract the risk that
workers' preferences will adapt to an unjust status quo. If it were
correct to say that without company unions, most workers would
be faced with a choice between well-functioning unions and an absence of collective representation, this argument might be
convincing. But the truth is that for a variety of reasons, unions are
not a likely option for most workers-and also that for many
workers, some kind of employee participation plan seems highly
attractive as a source of genuine improvements in workers' wellbeing."f
The conclusion is that with procedural constraints designed to
ensure real freedom of choice, workers should be allowed to waive
the apparent protections of the ban on company unions, at least if
they do so collectively. A constrained waiver, in short, would seem
to be far better than the current nonwaivable one; this is the route
that I suggest here.
IV. NONWAIVABLE WORKERS' RIGHTS

In this section, I generalize from the discussion to identify some
grounds for disallowing waiver. The central cases involve thirdparty effects, inadequate information, and efforts to change norms
and preferences, which involve third-party effects of a different
kind. The discussion of third-party effects draws on conventional
approaches; the treatment of inadequate information, and normchange and preference-change, draws on behavioral economics.
A. Third-PartyEffects
Most obviously, a nonwaivable background rule makes sense
when there are third-party effects. There are many examples. As

189
See Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Domination of Labor Organizations and the

Electromation Case: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1812,1822-26,1837-41 (1990).
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we will see, unions are not allowed to waive workers' fights to distribute work-related materials, partly because there is no identity
of interests between the waiving union and the workers whose
rights have been waived. The problem is that the waiver has effects
on third parties-that is, workers with interests distinct from those
of the union.
I have noted above that in a series of common law cases, courts
have created public policy exceptions to the at-will rule. The core
cases involve situations in which an employer discharges an employee for refusing to commit a crime (perjury, price fixing) on the
employer's behalf."' In other cases, courts have disallowed discharges when the employer is punishing employees for cooperating
with the authorities with respect to possible illegality at the company.!9' The defining theme is that employers may not discharge
employees if the consequence is to impose harms on outsiders to
the contractual relationship."9 It should be obvious that waivers are
unacceptable in these circumstances. The waiver is invalid not to
protect workers, but to ensure that others are not adversely affected. For the most part this category of cases is reasonably
straightforward, and hence it is not necessary to discuss it in detail
here.
B. InadequateInformation
In some cases, waivers will be inadequately informed. As we will
see, this is a key reason why the law is more hospitable to union
waivers than to individual waivers: Unions are in a far better position to know what they are doing. Individual waivers may be
inadequately informed for a large number of reasons, including excessive optimism, dissonance reduction, editing out, and myopia. A
great deal of empirical research is necessary to establish the extent
of the problem. For the moment, the best approach is to block exchanges of rights that most reasonable people would be unlikely to
110
See, e.g., Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980); Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733,735 (Tex. 1985).
19lSee, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879-80 (Ill. 1981);
McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Homes, 684 P.2d 21 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
11 See Schwab, supra note 33, at 1945.
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waive,"n but otherwise to allow waiver unless there is a particular
reason to believe that workers are giving up too much for too little.
When there is a serious risk to this effect, it would be best not to
block waiver entirely, but to impose procedural or substantive limits on acceptable waivers. Requirements of full disclosure, along
with a cooling off period, might be a minimal way to proceed.
C. Norm and Preference Change
Now let us turn to some of the most difficult and interesting
cases for waiver, involving what are perhaps best treated as subtle
endowment effects and third-party effects.
1. Waiver: The Basic Case
Suppose that an employer is averse to the threat of race or sex
discrimination suits. Seeking to produce a mutually advantageous
solution, he asks his employees to sign an agreement waiving their
rights to bring suit for race or sex discrimination. The employer
adds that he believes that discrimination is wrong and that he does
not plan to discriminate. He insists that he is not a discriminator.
He asks everyone, not only African-Americans and women, to sign
the waiver. He claims that he is willing to pay a premium for a
waiver, not in order to discriminate, but to insulate himself from
frivolous or trumped-up lawsuits. Suppose too that a small but nontrivial number of employees are willing to waive their rights,
because they believe that this is otherwise a good place to work,
because the premium is not tiny, and because they are willing to
take their chances on race and sex discrimination.
Let us also assume, plausibly, that if employees are presumed to
have the relevant entitlement, requests for waivers will be very
rare, partly because of the kind of signal given by such requests.
An employer who asks for these waivers will scare off a large number of employees and incur reputational sanctions. Nonetheless, it
is highly likely that some waiver requests would be made if they
were seen as valid. Note in this regard that there is evidence that
some discrimination laws do have an adverse effect on hiring
members of the protected class, precisely because of a fear of a

13

See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 8, at 359.
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lawsuit; an employee in that class represents a lawsuit waiting to
happen.1" Perhaps some of the disemployment effect could be removed with waivers. Should these waivers be upheld?
It might be tempting to see in the employer's proposal a coercive
offer: An employee is asked to waive his rights in return for a job,
and he may seem to have no choice but to waive. On this view, the
law should provide protection, and enhance freedom, by banning
the coercive deal. But this account is much too simple. In these
cases, the employee is not in a position of having no choice; the
question is whether the offer is worthwhile for the employee in
light of the options, perhaps most of them bad, that are available.
Unless there is an informational problem of some kind, the fact
that the employee accepts the deal is strong evidence that it is
worthwhile.
It is also possible to think that for some classes of workers, the
sheer number of job applicants, and the relatively small number of
jobs, will mean that employees will be forced to waive; those who
do not waive will not end up with jobs. This is certainly imaginable.
But in a market that is so unfavorable to workers, all employment
terms will be pushed in unfavorable directions, including wages.
Unless there is some kind of information problem, perhaps of the
kind discussed here, employees who waive stand to gain if they can
do so because those who waive will (by hypothesis) win more than
they lose. The best solution, in a market with this degree of harshness for employees, is to improve the background conditions faced
by those workers, not to block the best available deal, even though
that deal may not be very good.
2. Third-PartyEffects?
Thus far, at least, it seems that discrimination rights should be
fully waivable. But might individual waivers have adverse effects
on other workers? Begin with the context of sexual harassment,
where it is easy to imagine that they would. If one woman waives
her right and is thereafter subject to harassment, other women may
well be harmed; the effect will not be easy to cabin. At least this is
194See Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 70, at 273-82 (discussing
evidence of disemployment effect for disabled people); Posner, supra note 165, at
329-33 (discussing disemployment effect for older workers).
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so if the waiver leads would-be harassers to believe that harassment is not entirely objectionable or unacceptable, or that
reasonable women are willing to subject themselves to a risk of it
for a wage premium. A man who believes that it is permissible to
harass one woman might believe that it is permissible to harass
more than one, even if few waivers have been signed.
The example is easily extended to sex and race discrimination in
general. An African-American who is willing to waive the right to
be free from racially-motivated adverse employment action might
well be affecting other African-Americans, both by signaling the
legitimacy of discrimination and by indicating that discrimination is
not morally abhorrent but merely a cost, to be purchased and sold
like other goods on the market. If discrimination is so regarded,
there may well be more of it than if the signal is different-as, for
example, where a flat ban suggests that discrimination is illicit, the
sort of practice to be eliminated, rather than be brought to some
optimal point.195 Now this does not mean that discrimination should
be eliminated at any price. It means only that the moral stigma that
is sought to be imposed on discrimination, and properly so, might
be weakened if waivers are permitted. If this is so, isolated waivers
would have third-party effects.
3. Norm and Preference Change
This claim suggests several more concrete possibilities. Recall,
from the earlier discussion of the endowment effect, that the allocation of the entitlement can have effects on values and
preferences. In this light we can see that some antidiscrimination
law is an attempt to produce norm change. The point of the law is
to alter prevailing norms. If rights are waivable, that enterprise
might be undermined. If workers are living in accordance with a
norm that they abhor and wish to change, they are unlikely to be
able to accomplish the change on their own. By its very nature,
norm change requires collective action. The waiver is forbidden in
195Compare the area of pollution. Some people have objected to emissions
trading-a kind of waivable nonpollution right-on the same ground. See Steven
Kelman, What Price Incentives? 1 (1981). The best response is that there is an
optimal level of pollution, and it is not zero, and polluting activity-so long as it is
part of a legitimate business, and not an intentional tort-is not the kind of thing that
it is appropriate to delegitimate as such.
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order to ensure that certain norms are delegitimated. A closely related possibility is that the purpose of the relevant right is to
produce preference change. If preferences are not being taken as
given, but are being treated as endogenous and flexible, an argument for preventing waiver might be defended as a method for
ensuring that preferences are in fact changed.
With respect to the validity of discrimination waivers, these arguments are not decisive in the abstract. In a period in which race
and sex discrimination are widely stigmatized, it is reasonable to
believe that permitting waivers would have few significant effects
on workers not parties to the deal, or at the least that waivers
would not have a material effect in entrenching objectionable
norms and preferences. If an employer asks employees to waive
the right to be free from race or sex discrimination, it is signaling
that it is a possible discriminator-not the most attractive signal to
send out to prospective employees. On the other hand, some employees-white and male-might welcome that signal, and in these
circumstances the ban on waiver is understandable as an effort to
prevent inevitable effects on third parties who are likely to be affected by the legitimation of the underlying practice. When the law
is engaged in a self-conscious effort to change norms and preferences, allowing waivers is too likely to defeat the enterprise at
hand.1' 9
V. A BRIEF NOTE ON UNION WAIVERS
The discussion thus far has involved individual waivers, but a
frequent issue in employment law is whether labor unions are
themselves entitled to waive workers' rights. The general answer is
that when there are no third-party effects, union waivers are legally
acceptable," though in some contexts there is a self-conscious ef1960n the other hand, it is clear that victims of discrimination can settle, and at
least if they do not "tender back" the money, a financial settlement appears to

preclude a suit for reinstatement. See, e.g., Fleming v. United States Postal Serv.
AMF O'Hare, 27 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 1994). But see Rangel v. El Paso Natural

Gas Co., 996 F. Supp. 1093, 1096-99 (D.N.M. 1998) (allowing plaintiff's suit to
continue without "tendering back" and requiring that severance pay offset any
damages).

197See Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705 (1983); Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956); Lodges 743 & 1746, International Association of
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fort to ensure that any waiver is knowing and voluntary, in a kind
of procedural constraint on enforceable waivers. "8 Is it possible to
explain the law's receptivity to union waivers?
There are two points here, sharply distinguishing union waivers
from individual waivers. First, informational problems are highly
likely to have been overcome in the union setting. When a union is
waiving, it would be surprising, in the ordinary case, if it did so
without really knowing what it is doing. In all probability the problem of myopia will also have been reduced. Note in this regard that
unions are not solely concerned with wages, and that various fringe
benefits, likely to be favored by those interested in the long term,
are a special focus of union bargaining." Second, unions overcome
the collective action problem faced by individual workers, and this
point lessens the danger that employers will be able to force individual workers to waive by ensuring that they compete to their
collective detriment. It should be no wonder that serious concerns
about union waivers seem to arise only when the union has a conflict of interest, and hence is not in a position to be a good
representative of workers. Thus unions are permitted, in the most
noteworthy case, to waive workers' right to strike.' With respect
to the rights guaranteed by the NLRA, the situation is largely one
of waivable workers' rights-with the rights being waivable collectively only, and emphatically not individually.
Compare in this regard cases in which the union cannot be
trusted to be a fair representative of workers' interests, exemplified
by NLRB v. Magnovox Co."0 ' In that case, the union accepted a collective bargaining agreement that banned employees from
distributing literature on any of the employer's property, including
nonworking areas during nonworking time.' It is clear that this
rule would violate the law if imposed unilaterally by the employer.
Though the union had agreed to it, the Supreme Court held that
the waiver was not binding, for a collective bargaining agreement
could not eliminate these relevant rights. The Court said that
Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding waiver of
reinstatement rights after settlement of a strike).
See Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 709-10.
193
199
See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 15, at 20.
See Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. at 280.
20 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
See id. at 323.
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waiver would not be permitted "where the rights of the employees
to exercise their choice of a bargaining representative is involvedwhether to have no bargaining representative, or to retain the present one, or to obtain a new one."' The key problem was one of
agency-with respect to continuing debates about selfrepresentation, the union could not be trusted to be the faithful
agent of workers. This suggests a distinctive reason to disallow union waivers. Magnavox was followed by a series of cases that are
generally receptive to waivers by unions, but not when the waiving
union is likely to have divergent interests from those individuals
whose rights are waived."
One final wrinkle is important here. In many contexts, union
waivers must be explicit and unambiguous. A general no-strike
clause will not bar an unfair labor practice strike 5 and it will not
create an affirmative obligation on union leaders to avert strikes on
pain of discipline or discharge.' If employers are going to obtain
rights beyond those minimally contained in a no strike pledge, they
must do so explicitly. Here is a procedural constraint on the waiver
of workers' rights.
VI. THE PROBLEM OF RELATIVE POSITION

The discussion thus far has neglected an important and highly
relevant point from behavioral economics. I do not discuss it in detail, because it raises many complexities and depends on empirical
issues on which unambiguous evidence is lacking. But because the
point has been almost universally neglected in the context of employment and labor law, it requires some discussion.
A. Relative Positionand the Frame of Reference
Let us acknowledge that the cost of workers' rights, when they
are not waived, might be borne in whole or in part by workers, in
the sense that the legal grant of a right to workers will result in
lower wages. Is the argument against the relevant right therefore
2 Id. at 325.
2 See Michael C. Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA
(pts. 1&2), 4 Indus. Rel. L.J.335, 337 (1981).
See Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. at 280-84.
See Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 704-05.
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established, on the ground that workers will be net losers? We
have seen that one problem with an affirmative answer is that
workers might not be net losers. But a more fundamental problem
is that with respect to income, part of what workers seem to care
about is relative economic position, rather than absolute economic
position.' In other words, what matters to workers is partly how
they compare to others, not how much money they are making in
the abstract; and if all workers lose the same amount, each worker
will lose very little, because relative position will not be affected. If
what workers care about is relative position, nonwaivable rights
might, in principle, make workers better off on the dimension
along which they are helped, by giving them something important,
while not making them worse off along the dimension along which
they are apparently hurt, by decreasing their income while also decreasing that of everyone else.
Relative position is found by comparing the worker's income
with that of other salient workers; absolute position is found by
looking simply at the number of dollars that the worker makes.
The question is whether workers are significantly worse off in a
system in which all salient workers lose, for example, 0.5% of their
salary, while receiving a benefit (such as increased leisure time, parental leave, safety, or job security). If the economic loss has no
significant adverse effect, then any initiative that produces that loss
will not, by virtue of that consequence, harm workers at all. If this
is so, it is because income above a certain floor is a positional
good-a good whose value depends on comparison with the holdings of others. The noteworthy possibility here is that legal
initiatives might, in theory, produce real gains of one or another
kind (again, leisure time, parental leave, safety, or job security,
which are, by hypothesis, nonpositional or less positional goods),
without producing real losses (because the only loss is to absolute
position in terms of income, and because workers lose nothing if
absolute position is slightly worse while relative position is held
constant).

10See Frank, supra note 116, at 5; Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost
Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript on file with the author).
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There is considerable evidence that relative position is in fact
what people care about, at least with respect to income.2 Many
people would prefer to work in a place where they earn $60,000
and the average worker earns $50,000, to working in a place where
they earn $70,000 and the average worker earns $90,000." This
preference holds where everything else is equal-for example,
where the cost of living is the same in the two places.21 Why are
people prepared to sacrifice income to ensure a certain place in the
hierarchy? Undoubtedly envy and status-seeking play a large role.
Some people would like to have a high status and are willing to
lose money to ensure that they do. Perhaps more people would like
not to have a low status and are willing to lose absolute income in
order to ensure that they do not. But the more fundamental point
is that the economic position of other people sets the frame of reference within which we evaluate various goods. If you now had the
same computer that you used ten years ago, you would likely be
dissatisfied and frustrated, simply because the frame of reference
for evaluation of the computer has changed so dramatically. But if
everyone had the same computers that they had ten years ago,
your decade-old computer would not seem so bad; indeed it might
not seem bad at all.
What is true for computers is no less true for a vast array of
goods and services, including cars, radios, televisions, homes, and
even artistic and literary work. People care about relative position
not only because they care about their status, but also because they
are aware that the frame of reference for evaluation is set not individually but socially.
B. Mandatory Terms and Relative Position
For the moment let us simply assume that relative rather than
absolute economic position is what most workers care about-that
worker well-being would not be decreased by (say) a decrease in
annual wages of $25, $50, or $100, so long as all workers face the
same decrease. In that event, some nonwaivable terms, such as a
-Frank, supra note 116, at 5; see also Frank & Sunstein, supra note 207, at 9-17
(presenting some of the evidence).

See Frank & Sunstein, supra note 207, at 11.

210Id.
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right to job security, might be justified on the following ground:
The consequence of the new term is to decrease absolute income
but to hold relative income constant. From this shift, there is little
or no welfare loss to workers. At the same time, workers receive a
substantial benefit, such as job security, vacation time, or health
care. As far as the worker is concerned, the substantial benefit is
given essentially for free, because relative position is held constant.
If relative position is in fact what workers care about, this appears
to be a powerful argument for a wide range of nonwaivable workers' rights.
C. Difficulties
I believe that this argument is largely correct, but as stated it is
too abstract to be entirely convincing. It raises three questions in
particular.
Perhaps relative position is also what workers care about with
respect to the new, legally granted benefit; perhaps this too is a positional good. Many goods have a mixture of positional and
nonpositional features. It does seem reasonable to say that such
goods as job security, health care benefits, and leisure time have
especially strong nonpositional features. It is important to have
these things regardless of what other people have; an increase in
any of them, far more than an increase in money, is an independent
good. But job security, leisure time, and the like also have positional features; to lack, for example, job security when everyone
else lacks job security is probably better than to lack job security
when everyone else has it. For the argument on behalf of the nonwaivable term to be made convincing, it must be true that relative
position is what matters with respect to income-or to whatever
else is lost as a result of the nonwaivable term-but that what matters for the good in question, such as job security, is not relative but
absolute position. Perhaps we can conclude that the nonpositional
features of job security, health care benefits, and leisure time are
enough to give the argument a kind of presumptive validity.
It is possible that a nonwaivable right to a certain largely nonpositional good, such as job security, will lead not only to
reductions in income (by hypothesis a positional good) but also to
reductions in nonpositional goods (such as vacation leave, sick
leave, health care, or parental leave). If the grant of one nonposi-
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tional good leads to a decrease in others, there will be nothing to
celebrate. There is an empirical question here: When government
creates a mandatory benefit, to what extent does the result decrease not income, but other, less positional benefits associated
with employment?
To what extent is income actually a positional good? There is
considerable evidence that for most people, what matters to perceived well-being is their position in the relevant hierarchy, above
a certain minimum level. 1 For very poor workers, of course, absolute income may be what matters. In poor nations, absolute
increases in wealth affect self-reported happiness levels, and absolute increases affect self-reported happiness levels among the very
poor. To the extent that mandatory terms reduce the income of
people with little to live on, such terms are not likely to be justifiable on the ground that I have offered. Of course, few mandatory
terms will have this effect.
The nonwaivable right might impose ancillary social costs. It
might, for example, force prices to rise, and the resulting inefficiencies may bolster an argument against the nonwaivable term. Even
when workers are benefited as a result, the term might not be justified on balance; an increase in prices is hardly good news for
workers (especially poor ones), and if unemployment increases as
well, the nonwaivable term may not be worthwhile.
In light of these points, an understanding of the importance of
relative position does not create a decisive argument for nonwaivable terms in employment law. But it does raise a behavioral
possibility, overlooked in conventional discussions of these problems: Even if such terms create a dollar-for-dollar reduction in
wages, workers may still benefit as a result.
CONCLUSION

My basic goal in this Article has been to bring a better understanding of human behavior to bear on the three principal options
for employment law: waivable employers' rights, waivable workers'
rights, and nonwaivable workers' rights. Contrary to the Coase
theorem, the default rule is likely to matter a great deal. Contrary
21,See

Robert H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of
Excess 107-21 (1999); Frank & Sunstein, supra note 207, at 9-17.
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to the standard view in law and economics, workers are loss averse;
they will be reluctant to give up fights and goods that have been
initially allocated to them-a point confirmed by employers' reluctance to decrease wages, even during a recession. 2 Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, workers do not understand that the current
system is at will, even though the law to this effect is wellestablished. Contrary to the reflexive antipaternalism of many lawyers and economists, workers are likely to have difficulty in
deciding whether to waive their rights, and hence the case for nonwaivable terms, defended in behavioral terms, is far more plausible
than it appears when defended in terms of simple redistribution.
Contrary to the standard economic wisdom, workers often care
about relative position, not absolute position. Contrary to standard
legal practice, waivable workers' rights represent an attractive alternative in many contexts, responsive in particular to workers'
lack of information. Contrary to a standard legal view, the difference between legal hostility to individual waivers and legal
receptivity to union waivers is defensible on the ground that unions
are less likely to suffer from myopia and other forms of bounded
rationality.
We have seen more particularly that waivable workers' rights
represent a distinctive, promising, and insufficiently explored approach to the law of labor relations. A system of this kind will
often be preferable to the more standard alternatives of waivable
employers' rights and nonwaivable workers' rights. To the extent
that workers undervalue the rights initially allocated to them and
sell them for a price that is too low, it is sensible to consider, as an
alternative to a ban on waiver, a system of constrained waiverranging from requirements of disclosure, to a cooling-off period, to
legal floors on what employees will receive through the relevant
trades.
In the area of the contract at will, I have suggested that legislatures should experiment with waivable for-cause rules, and also
that courts should move in this direction by penalizing employers
who lead employees to believe that they have protection against atwill discharge (as, for example, through promises of permanent
employment and through statements that company policy is to re212

See Bewley, supra note 3.
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tain all good employees). If progress is to be made in improving
worker well-being without introducing excessive rigidity into the
labor market, the best route for the future will consist of more
creative experiments with waivable workers' rights.
For many problems, it would make sense to combine a system of
nonwaivable statutory minima, consisting of safeguards that no
worker should lack, with an ample set of waivable workers' rights
that would be subject to bargaining. There is room for disagreement about what should count as the nonwaivable minima and
what should count as the waivable workers' rights; it is in identifying the content of these categories, rather than in settling on the
basic approach, that reasonable disputes will arise. An approach of
this general kind is no blueprint, but it suggests an orientation that
could provide the foundation for a new system of employment law
in a wide range of areas. Equally important, an understanding of
the nature of workers' judgments and motivations, and the possible
grounds for choosing among the legal options, could provide the
basis for orienting future inquiry and for making progress on the
issues, many of them empirical in nature, that remain.
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APPENDIX: ECONOMICS, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS,
AND THE WORKPLACE

In this Article I have discussed many issues in employment law
and behavioral economics. The purpose of this Appendix is to outline the central parts of the conventional wisdom that are called
into question by evidence and by' a better understanding of human
behavior. Of special importance is the last column, emphasizing
what we do not yet know. Much of my argument here has been for
a degree of agnosticism with respect to positive issues (what people
do) and normative issues (what the law should do). Much more
work is necessary on both sorts of issues.
Conventional
wisdom,
grounded in
oncestandardor
nowstandard
economic
theory

Empirical
difficulty

Behavioral
mechanism(s)

Legal implications

Implicit behavioral
rationality in
currentlaw

What we
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opportunistic behavior
will not oc-
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retirement;
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Conventional
wisdom

Empirical
difficulty

Behavioral
mechanism(s)

Legal inplications

Workers
know about
at-will and
other default rules

Workers
do not
know
about atwill and
other default rules

Unclear.
Perhaps
excessive
optimism;
perhaps the
"law-iswhatfairnessrequires"
heuristic

Take ambiguous
promises as
real promises;
waivable
for-cause
rule

Implicit behavioral
rationality in
currentlaw
Yes, through
aggressive
reading of
apparent
promises
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Conventional
wisdom

Empirical
difficulty

Behavioral
mechanism(s)

Legal implications

Implicit behavioral
rationality in
current law

What we
don't know

Default rule
is irrelevant
without
transaction
costs

Default
rule sticks
in experimental and
real-world
settings

Endowment effect;
loss aversion
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No, except
perhaps
through nonwaivable
rights

How should
we choose a
rule when
there will
be an
endowment
effect? Are
there significant
distributional
effects
here? How

sticky are
default
rules, for
employees
and employers?
Informed
workers will
reach bargains that
are in their
interests

Workers
appear not
to bargain
for some
items that
might be in
their interest

Excessive
optimism;
signaling
problems;
myopia

Nonwaivable
workers'
rights

Maybe,
through statutory bans on
waiver
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Conventional
wisdom

Empirical
difficulty

Behavioral
mechanism(s)

Legal implications

Unions
shouldn't
be allowed
to waive so
much more
easily than
individuals

Law allows
union waivers more
readily
than
individual
waivers

Bounded
rationality,
a problem
reduced by
unions

Allow union waivers
more readily (implicit
behavioral
rationality
in cases)

Workers
are paid
their marginal
product and
hence nonwaivable
terms can
only help

Labor
market appears to
show wage
compression;
people appear willing
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income for
good, or
not bad,
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People care
about relative
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with respect
income

Nonwaivable
workers'
rights
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